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ABOUT THIS WORKING PAPER SERIES
The green revolution and the global integration of food markets were supposed to relegate 
scarcity to the annals of history. So why did thousands of people in dozens of countries take 
to the streets when world food prices spiked in 2008 and 2011? Are food riots the surest route 
to securing the right to food in the twenty-first century? We know that historically, food riots 
marked moments of crisis in the adjustment to more market-oriented or capitalist food and 
economic systems. Food riots featured as part of a politics of provisions that helped hold public 
authorities to account for protecting people during price spikes or shortages. 
This research project interrogated this contemporary moment of historical rupture in the global 
food system through comparative analysis of Bangladesh, India, Kenya and Mozambique in 
the period 2007–12. This was a period of intensely volatile food prices as well as unusual lev-
els of food-related popular mobilisation – unruly political events like riots but also more organ-
ised action like the Right to Food movement in India. During the global food crisis of 2007–8 
alone, food riots (or subsistence protests) were reported in 30 countries. In many, including 
the four in our study, the food crisis triggered changes in domestic food security arrangements. 
Working with multiple methods and at different levels with media content, with activists and 
protesters, and with policy and political elites, this research asked: What motivated people to 
mobilise around food? And did popular mobilisation effect or influence such changes?
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SUMMARY
In 2008, the international media listed Bangladesh among the low-income countries that saw 
food riots during the global food price crisis. The most notable of these events took place in 
the pre-monsoon Dhaka heat on 13 April, when workers in the vital export-oriented garments 
sector took to the streets in a graphic flash of anger at low pay in a time of high staple food 
prices. Around that time, the government of Bangladesh set in motion efforts to stabilise 
food prices, to protect those hit hardest by the spike. These efforts were not simple matters: 
the crisis was global, not easily managed by a single country government. Meanwhile India, 
the main source of Bangladesh’s rice imports, closed its borders to protect its own citizens. 
Yet the Bangladesh authorities ultimately succeeded, and their policy choices and the 
institutional architecture that made them possible affirmed Bangladesh’s reputation for an 
effective and responsive food (if not nutrition) security policy. 
This research set out to find out whether these events were causally related: did these ‘food 
riots’ trigger or activate these responsive and effective food security policies in any sense? 
The Bangladesh case study (the present paper) is part of a comparative four country study 
(including India, Kenya and Mozambique) which aimed to test the proposition that popular 
mobilisation – riots or more organised civil society action – engendered public accountability 
for hunger during the period of global food price volatility in 2007–12. The proposition was 
motivated by a reading of the lessons of European history for the present period of globalised 
financial and commodity price volatility. These lessons suggest that during subsistence 
crises, food riots were an effective strategy for the relatively powerless masses to hold public 
authorities to account, and that they were most common in moments of transition towards 
more market-oriented food regimes. For contemporary Bangladesh, we hypothesised that 
there were both strong moral economy and powerful political economy reasons to believe 
that food riots may have played such a triggering role. Garments workers had the means and 
motive to organise. Policymakers and politicians had the incentives and the institutions with 
which to respond. 
To tackle these issues, the research used a multi-sited research methodology that integrated: 
a) catalogues of the numbers and types of protests that occurred, using media content 
analysis; b) close-grained case studies of the motivations and organisation of protest groups 
using primary qualitative research; and c) semi-structured interviews with key policymakers, 
activists and informed scholars, designed to reconstruct the policy thinking of the time. 
The results of the research failed to validate the proposition that riots engendered 
accountability for hunger: we found no strong evidence that any of the protests, even the 
most visceral and important, the garments workers’ protests, had directly influenced the 
policy response. But this was not because popular protest had no power in this context. 
Instead, it reflected the fact that protest was, in the main, unnecessary. The garments 
workers’ protests highlighted the plight of low-paid urban workers during the food crisis, 
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but the official machinery was already working to address the situation in its usual mode. 
If anything, the research findings suggest the causality went in the opposite direction: that 
the existence (over a longer time period) of relatively effective policies and an institutional 
architecture for response, and an associated expectation of public action during subsistence 
crises meant it made sense for garments workers (and a small number of other groups) to 
protest at this time: their basic survival was threatened, they were able to organise, and they 
had reasonable expectations that their actions would elicit a response. 
Looked at closely, both the ‘food riots’ and the policy response turned out to be more 
ambiguous and contingent than their headlines suggest. What the long lenses of the global 
media framed as ‘food riots’ looked different up close and through the filter of domestic 
politics – arguably these were not food riots in any common sense of the term. As for the 
policy response, while over the medium term this was sound enough, for those facing 
hunger it was too late and perhaps also too little. That the government of the moment was 
an unelected military-backed caretaker regime lent the perception that the lagged response 
reflected the absence of powerful electoral pressures for action. Tellingly, the popular 
assessment of the situation was that a democratically elected (‘political government’ in the 
local term) would have responded faster and better. (It is not clear that this is in fact the case, 
as the supra-national nature of the crisis was a complexity and a constraint.)
The garments workers’ protests may not have been the cause of the policies that tackled the 
food price spike, but our analysis suggests that these events were correlated, both rooted 
in the moral and political economy of subsistence crises in Bangladesh. Our analysis of the 
2007–12 period is a mere snapshot of a more dynamic historical cycle of interaction between 
popular mobilisation and policy responses. During this period, ‘food riots’ did not trigger the 
policy response but over the longer term, the causality seems to run in the other direction: 
garments workers protested because they were excluded from the protections enjoyed by 
other Bangladeshis, and because they had good reason to believe that responsive and 
effective policies could also be established for them. Their struggle – framed as wages and 
workers’ rights, not food rights – is ongoing. 
We conclude that ‘food riots’ or indeed subsistence protests, did not occur on any significant 
scale in Bangladesh because they were generally unnecessary: there is a functioning ‘politics 
of provisions’ here that ensures that ruling elites cannot ignore mass subsistence crises like 
2008 without incurring a disempowering loss of legitimacy. For politico-historical, electoral 
and possibly ecological reasons, the compact between the Bangladeshi masses and their 
ruling elites centres on the protection of subsistence during shocks. The 1974 famine casts a 
particularly long shadow over food policy in Bangladesh, serving as a reminder of the fragility 
both of subsistence and of political legitimacy in this context. The ‘politics of provisions’ in 
Bangladesh work to keep basic food (not nutrition) security at the top of the political and 
policy agenda. Few Bangladeshis need to risk actual food riots because most of those 
exposed to such shocks receive the protection they need, more or less when they need it. 
By the time a riot occurs, it is already too late: the threat of the loss of legitimacy is powerful 
enough to drive a reasonable policy and political response. 
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1INTRODUCTION
1. iNTRODUCTION
Thousands of garment workers in the Bangladeshi capital of Dhaka went 
on strike today, closing factories in protest at spiralling food prices.
Demonstrators clashed with police after smashing cars and shops. Local 
agencies said the army had to be brought in to bring the situation under 
control, and had police opened fire to scatter the striking workers. Nearly 
two dozen people were injured.
The disruption crippled Bangladesh’s garment industry, the country’s 
biggest export earner, with dozens of factories shutting for the day.
The riots came after stone-throwing crowds clashed with police over the 
weekend. Factory workers say high food prices have meant many have 
little to eat, and are demanding wage increases. 
‘Bangladeshi garment workers strike over food prices’. R. Ramesh, The 
Guardian, 15 April 2008 
People in general think the Government is responsible if there is a 
problem. They know they get food from the market but people expect 
Government to ensure food supply and Government expects to have to. 
In other countries you have to reach the level of food riots. You don’t need 
to have food riots in this country ...
Why [were there] no riots in Bangladesh? First of all, because 
Government acts first. Second, it is more difficult for riots to be generated 
because … population, type of history ... social control is much more 
effective. So riots here are much less frequent or feasible or normal than 
in South Africa or any African place or even in Middle East  
Interview with expert on Bangladesh food policy, Dhaka, 11 July 2013 
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The food riots that never were
In April 2008, at the height of the global food price crisis, the international 
media listed Bangladesh among the low-income countries in which food riots 
occurred. The Bangladesh media interpreted these events very differently (see 
below). 
Figure 1 CNN: food riots in Bangladesh 14 April 2008; Daily Star: RMG worker pay protests 13 
April 2008
       
An analysis of these events (however labelled) is at the centre of this paper, 
because we think understanding the motivations and means of the protesters 
will shed valuable light on the prospects for accountability for hunger. This is 
particularly urgent at a time when food prices have been unusually volatile 
and poor people around the world (for whom development has meant more 
integration with, and therefore more reliance on, markets for their food) 
have been less assured of food access. We think that popular mobilisation 
– whether riots or civil society organisation – may be the means of triggering 
public accountability for food security. In this paper we aim to explore these 
issues, looking at the motivations and means that people facing subsistence 
crises had for protesting, and at the types and levels of response these elicit 
from the policymakers and politicians with the power to respond. 
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3INTRODUCTION
1.1. Research Objectives 
This paper was originally supposed to answer the central question raised by the parent project 
to which it contributes, namely, 
Did popular mobilisation during the 2007–12 global food price crises increase 
accountability for hunger? 
The parent project, a study called Food Riots and Food Rights: the moral and political economy 
of accountability for hunger, was designed to test the proposition, derived from a reading of 
how food riots featured in the politics of provisions in European history, that food protests could 
positively influence the institutionalisation of public action on food insecurity during food crises 
by making public authorities more responsive and accountable. We decided to explore this 
through an analysis across countries that had their similarities of socioeconomic context and 
political history, yet which had also experienced and responded to the 2008 and 2011 global 
food crises quite differently.  
Having completed our case studies and comparative analysis, the central question still seems 
to help us make sense of how people and governments behaved in the other countries in the 
study – India, Kenya and Mozambique. But for Bangladesh, the question now seems wrong. 
Now that we have a deeper understanding of what happened, the interesting question to ask 
about Bangladesh is (as several interviewees pointed out): 
Why was there so little popular mobilisation around food in Bangladesh during 2007–
12?
An informed observer would have expected food riots in Bangladesh at this time. It has 
developed fast, yet millions of Bangladeshis still live on low and precarious incomes, spending 
more than half their incomes on staple foods (rice, essentially) alone. Millions of rural-urban 
migrants, many of them climate change refugees, live packed in close quarters, working the 
same jobs, shopping in the same bazaars, and facing the same hardships. Bangladesh has 
an unusually rich tradition of unruly politics, so food riots would hardly be a stretch. That rich 
grain traders gain from speculation and hoarding during periods of dearth is an article of faith 
in popular political culture. Yet, with the odd, interesting and highly particular exception of the 
garments workers, there were no major protests about the cost of food at this time. Explaining, 
exploring and resolving this puzzle is what this paper is all about. 
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1.2. Background to the Food Riots and Food Rights project
The need to strengthen accountability for food insecurity has become more pressing since the 
2008 food price spike. Feeding the world in this context presents a political challenge – how to 
institutionalise accountability and responsiveness towards the hungry – as much as a technical 
or economic one. The period since the mid-2000s offers an opportunity to study the popular 
politics of accountability for hunger, because of the (not coincidental) rise in the level of popular 
mobilisation around food globally. The right to food movements that emerged in developing 
countries since the mid-2000s and the upsurge in food riots and protests since 2007 both 
signal strong popular pressures for a response to the increasing uncertainties people face 
around access to food. Yet little is known about who mobilises, why and what they seek to 
change. Nor are there convincing explanations of whether and how such mobilisation actually 
induces public policy changes that strengthen accountability for action on hunger. This study 
aims to contribute to filling these gaps. 
There were three motivations for the study. The first was the recent period of food price volatility 
and associated protest, in particular the 2007–8 ‘food crisis’ which marked the end of three 
decades of low world food prices and the start of a period of global food price volatility featuring 
major spikes in 2008 and 2011 (Clapp 2009; Gilbert and Morgan 2010; Naylor and Falcon 
2010; FAO 2009; Von Braun and Gebreyohanes 2012). Global food prices rose sharply and 
unpredictably after 2007 (see Figure 2) giving rise to concerns about the impacts on poverty 
and food insecurity. 
Figure 2 World food prices since 1960 S
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5INTRODUCTION
In 2007–8, there were incidents labelled ‘food riots’ in as many as 30 countries, and the 2011 
uprisings that turned into the Arab Spring were related to food prices (Schneider 2008; Lagi, 
Bertrand and Bar-Yam 2011). Cross-country research has correlated price spikes with unrest, 
finding, among other things, that low-income countries and weakly democratic polities are 
particularly prone to riots; and that the relationship between global food prices and civil unrest 
has become stronger with market integration and the ‘contagion’ effect of the internet and 
social networking (Arezki and Bruckner 2011; Arora, Swinnen and Verpoorten 2011; Bellemare 
2011). 
One of the concerns that this project aimed to address was that cross-country work tends to 
‘sophisticate and quantify evidence which is only imperfectly understood’ (Thompson 1971: 
77) because it relies substantially on ‘spasmodic’ explanations of why people riot that reduce 
people to bellied bodies. We learn little about the political perspectives on food markets 
that inform protests (although see Hossain 2009; Patel and McMichael 2009; Bush 2010; 
Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; O’Brien 2012). For Thompson, exploring the moral economy 
helps us address the question: ‘[b]eing hungry…what do people do? How is their behaviour 
modified by custom, culture, and reason?’ (Thompson 1971: 77–8). Our research is designed 
to understand not only what the motivations for such protests are, but also what Bohstedt has 
called ‘the politics of provisions’: the political opportunities or triggers that give rise to such 
protests, the means and modes of organisation and repertoires of political action, and the 
political and policy responses of the public authorities (Bohstedt 2014; 2010). 
A second reason these issues merit research now is that ideas about rights to food, a set of 
rights with legally enforceable claims and institutional support, often within international human 
rights legal frameworks, are fast gaining ground. This includes in countries like India, where 
getting a basic meal has been the primary struggle for generations. If claims to food within the 
moral economy rest on custom or tradition, how might a legally enforceable human right to 
food change that? To what extent might the institutional and legal basis shape the ideas about 
how food markets should function? 
A third reason to explore the causes and effects of food-related protest is the increasingly global 
integration of food markets. Do small country governments have the power to protect people 
against food price changes that arise in global commodity markets? If not, can moral economy 
ideas survive persistent enduring failures by public authorities? The moral economy in the 
historical past was fed by its successes; what if food riots fail, or are put down, or become so 
routine that they are safely ignored? How meaningful can protests and the ideas about the moral 
economy be if their objective is national governments faced with volatile global food markets? 
 
6THE FOOD RIOTS THAT NEVER WERE: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD SECURITY IN BANGLADESH
1.3 Impacts and implications of the 2008 price spike and food 
price rises
The short-term impacts on food security of the 2008 price spike were generally considered to 
be potentially serious. A significant body of evidence suggested there were immediate cuts 
in consumption: substitution for lower value and less diverse diets, cuts in meal size, cuts in 
meal frequency among the poor (Matin 2009; World Bank 2013; Rashid, Hasan, and Hossain 
2012), with particularly serious implications for women (Levay et al. 2013). This also meant 
short-term nutritional impacts: evidence from a re-survey of nutritional status among a cohort 
of poor families showed that between 2006 and 2008 they were spending more on food, and 
relatively more on rice (less dietary diversity or quality). The prevalence of wasting (acute 
malnutrition) among two to five year olds in rural areas rose from 17 to 23 per cent (an increase 
of 34 per cent) and in urban areas from 14 to 21 per cent (increase of 47 per cent) between 
2006 and 2008. This implied an increase of two-thirds of a million children who were wasting 
(i.e. suffering from acute malnutrition)(Save the Children 2009).
The poor (around 40 per cent of the population were estimated to live below the official 
(ungenerous) poverty line in 2008) were hit the hardest because food already absorbed the 
majority of their spending when prices were low. Yet even those not officially designated poor, 
including white-collar workers and middle class groups, were hit particularly hard in the short 
term. An informal indicator of the severity of the shock as cited by the Department of Agriculture 
Marketing (the government agency tasked with producing monitoring data on food prices and 
availability) was that a ‘long queue of even the middle class families was seen to purchase 
from the BDR shops … during the crisis period’ (Khan and Wadud 2010: 1).
Within the period under consideration, and possibly even as early as 2010, discussion of these 
adverse short-term impacts fell away to be replaced by recognition that cash incomes had 
started to rise and fast. The effects were particularly rapid in rural areas, and for rice farmers 
and workers associated with food grain production. But rapid and large wage and income 
rises were also documented in the informal sector and in industrial manufacturing (mainly the 
RMG sector, albeit from a low starting point). The emerging policy consensus is that in the 
medium term, food price rises have been a boon for Bangladesh’s poor, because they have 
pushed up rural wages and ultimately urban wages too, as the surplus labour force has been 
absorbed (see Hossain 2010; Zhang et al. 2013). Most vitally, the rice wage – the amount of 
rice the daily wage rate can buy – has increased significantly in the past few years. Data from 
the 2011–12 Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey found that the rice wage rate was now 
more than three times average daily household needs, at more than 7kg per day (A.U. Ahmed 
et al. 2013).
Although the recent rise in cash incomes is seen in development policy circles within 
Bangladesh as an unmitigated good, this development also marks a sharp acceleration in the 
process of commodification in Bangladesh. This is manifested in: a) greater dependence on 
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wage markets and cash incomes across the board; b) growing dependence on women’s paid 
work, possibly at the expense of their unpaid caring labour and/or possibilities for leisure and 
wellbeing and with significant implications for gender roles; c) deeper dependence on food 
markets which can, demonstrably, be volatile and unreliable; and d) a likely increase in the 
nuclearisation of household relations and a decline in social cohesion within moral communities. 
 That is, the recent sharp rise in food prices is likely to have been associated with a series of 
social upheavals and trends with mixed impacts on human wellbeing. 
So who were the winners and the losers? In the short term, the losers comprised mainly 
poor people on low and precarious incomes but also lower middle income groups on fixed 
wages or salaries. This latter group includes public sector workers, including teachers, 
nurses, clerical workers and manual workers. In the medium-term, wages and incomes 
have been pushed up. There is considerably more controversy over the winners from 
food price rises. There is a widespread popular belief in the idea that market actors of 
various kinds and at different levels tend to benefit from price spikes and other kinds 
of food crises, because of the scope for profiteering from speculation and hoarding. 
 Such groups tend to include ‘syndicates’ or cartels with influence over national markets 
conditions, comprising small numbers of well-connected individual businessmen networked 
around specific commodity markets, particularly grain importers, and licence-holders to import 
or process various food items such as edible oil. More localised actors believed to benefit are 
large wholesalers, rice mill owners, storage owners (to a lesser extent), and the full range of 
types of local traders involved in the chain of grain purchase from farmers through to retail. 
It is not only during food price spikes, shortages or other such shocks that these groups are 
understood to make undue profits: in ‘normal’ periods, too, food traders are popularly believed 
to be unscrupulous and satisfied to make what are seen as excessive profits from illicit or 
illegal practices in the wholesale or retail of food. In the past decade, this has included food 
adulteration – the use of additives to process food to prevent it perishing or to enhance its 
appearance to buyers. High food prices raise the returns from food adulteration, which may 
explain why the past decade has seen a perceived rise in the practice, an upsurge of public 
opinion against such practices, and powerful new legislation to curb it. 
There is a substantial literature in support of food trade liberalisation in Bangladesh, which 
stresses that private sector participation in food grain markets has greatly improved their 
efficiency, and in particular has stabilised prices during crises (see Ravallion 1985; Del 
Ninno, Dorosh and Smith 2003; Adams and Richard 1998; Dowlah 2006; Dorosh 2001). Yet 
another body of literature offers close-grained accounts showing that rice market performance 
is uneven, and that market intermediaries have a strong local effect which can amount to 
significant distortions in volatile times (Crow 1989; Crow and Murshid 1994; Adams and Richard 
1998; CPD 2008). A key conclusion appears to be that efforts to control or tighten grain market 
practices during food crises tend to increase the tendency to speculate or hoard. 
Although rice producers benefited in the medium term from food price rises, it is not clear that 
they did so in the short term, or that smaller farmers benefited as much as larger farmers. 
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This is largely because smaller farmers tend to rely more on pre-harvest trader credit to 
cover input costs, and so to sell grain at lower prices when the market price is low. Over the 
medium term, both smaller and larger famers have been able to gain from stable higher prices, 
but volatility still has more adverse impacts on smaller farmers, who are less able to buffer 
against price shocks, including input prices. In their most recent analysis of poverty trends in 
Bangladesh, the World Bank has noted the decoupling of land ownership trends from poverty 
reduction trends: while this is presented positively as evidence that landlessness no longer so 
fully condemns rural people to a permanent state of poverty, it is also arguably true that poor 
people have been pushed off the land and into non-farm activities because land ownership is 
so closely guarded by powerful groups. This process is likely to accelerate as the value of food 
crops rises. Farm size is not large in Bangladesh as a whole, but the past decade has seen a 
proportional increase in the numbers of rural landless households but a relative decline in the 
proportion of farm and farm labour households, suggesting a concentration of control over the 
benefits of agriculture (BBS 2009).
The industry elite, comprising factory owners and their association leadership, had considerable 
potential to benefit in the medium term from the food price spike. This was because while 
RMG workers were hit particularly hard by the price spike, there was considerable political 
pressure on government to act to control price rises and/or to mitigate their impacts on low-
income populations, particularly the politically volatile urban groups. If the outcome had been 
large-scale efforts to provide targeted support to such groups through, for instance massive 
permanent rationing programmes as had been in place until the early 1990s, this would have 
constituted in effect a subsidy to manufacturing industry, because it would have reduced the 
pressure to increase wages. 
In the longer term, however, poor nutrition is likely to have had an adverse impact on 
the productivity of the labour force, and so on the scope for industrial upgrading and 
competitiveness. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the industry leadership did not 
draw connections between nutrition and labour productivity. By contrast, workers’ leaders 
and workers themselves do draw such connections, recognising the impacts on ill health 
of poor diets. 
Local elites, comprising both customary community leaders and elected representatives 
at the Union Parishad and upazila or sub-district level, benefited from the price spike to 
the extent that food transfer schemes and new social protection programmes such as the 
100 days employment scheme, were rolled out or expanded during this period. The scope 
for corruption aside, these schemes tend to enable a considerable amount of discretion 
in beneficiary selection because of the rationing involved. This enables local elites to 
use resources for patronage purposes, so that the increase in food security and social 
protection schemes are of direct benefit to the political goals of local elites. 
Two key ideas have been influential within domestic political discourse, and were 
themselves influenced by the food price spikes, over this period. The first is the Dreze-Sen 
thesis that famines do not occur in democratic regimes with a free press. This thesis was 
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explicitly cited in some civil society/thinktank discussions at a time when overt criticism of 
the unelected military backed CTG regime was constrained. This referred to the perception 
that the CTG regime was relatively ineffectual in its handling of the 2008 crisis, and that 
their apparent lack of responsiveness reflected the weakness of popular pressure on 
public policy at the time. For political parties, food price spikes are politically intolerable 
because of the acute sensitivities to acute hunger resulting from the political history of 
the country. The view that the CTG regime responded inadequately because of its lack of 
electoral pressure also resonated with ordinary citizens on low incomes, some of whom 
when interviewed in 2009 noted that a ‘political government’ would have done more to 
protect people. It is not clear that an elected government could in fact have done more to 
buck the global food price spike, particularly once India closed its borders. However, the 
coincidence of the timing is likely to have reinforced the power of this idea. It is notable that 
in the most recent democratic transition crisis of 2013, the customary reversion to the idea 
that the army should take over from dysfunctional party politics has been aired rarely and 
attracted tepid support compared to previous eras. 
A second important idea is that which primarily concerns policymaking circles, including 
the international development partners and their supporting research and thinktanks. This 
is that reliance on the global food economy is sufficient to guard against food crises: a 
particularly major policy shift has been the significant increase in public food stocks storage 
capacity – and the corresponding acceptance of the need for such stocks. Although this 
was not fully acknowledged in our interviews, this marks a considerable about-turn from 
the more neo-liberal faith in international trade as the best means of smoothing food price 
volatilities even in the short term. The current state of thinking, even within the World 
Bank, once the champion of cutting public food stocks, appears to be that government 
preparedness is vital, because international trade (demonstrably) cannot be relied upon 
because some countries may introduce protectionist domestic policies. The ideological 
ideal – of a fully free global market in food grains – may not have suffered, but its application 
in the real world does appear to have been challenged. 
 1.4 How this paper is organised 
This paper is one of four country case studies produced to research these questions through 
the Food Riots and Food Rights project, and it focuses exclusively on the Bangladesh research 
findings. It is organised as follows: 
•	 Section 2 discusses the key concepts, hypotheses or propositions involved in the 
research questions, and then sets out the research methodology, including a detailed 
discussion of each of the three main components of the primary research; 
•	 A reader who is interested less in the mechanics of research and more in its findings 
should skip straight to Section 3, which sets out findings about the protests which did 
occur in this period, based on a political events catalogue and qualitative case studies 
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of protest groups and events;
•	 Section 4 discusses the findings about the policy response, setting these in the context 
of the policy process in Bangladesh;
•	 Section 5 concludes with an analysis and discussion of the findings, and some 
implications for policy.
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2. Research methodology
2.1  Concepts and Research Questions
The research methodology has been designed to test the proposition that popular mobilisation 
increased accountability for food insecurity during the 2007–12 period of food price volatility; 
for the purposes of this Bangladesh case study, the findings address the question of why 
relatively little protest took place, despite the conditions for such protest apparently being 
ripe. We do this through a close examination of the small number of protests that did occur, to 
understand who felt compelled to protest, and the nature of their grievance and demands. We 
also look at relevant policy changes and decisions during the period, interpreting these in light 
of the views of policymakers and informed observers.
Food riots 
The paper focuses on protests around food during this period – who protested, why and to 
what effect – because these grant us access to the moral and political economy of food security 
policies at a time of great global price volatility. A key notion is that of ‘food riots’, and at the heart 
of the paper is an exploration of a set of events that may or may not be termed such. During 
our interviews with carefully selected key informants in Bangladesh, we repeatedly faced the 
same question. ‘Why focus on food riots? There were no food riots here’. Our answer: ‘That is 
not what the international media said’. In truth, there is a genuine ambiguity here, and it is not 
clear that our research can finally resolve it. Much depends on what you think a ‘food riot’ is; 
more still on how reportage of the garments workers’ protests (then and now, as their struggle 
continues) is filtered through media biases on the one hand, and the commanding political 
interests surrounding the Bangladesh garments industry, on the other. No research is likely to 
be able to pronounce definitively on these events. The present paper does more than most by 
offering a perspective on them informed by multiple sources of data, and varying levels and 
modes of analysis. The picture we provide of the happenings around food policy in 2007–12 
is therefore kaleidoscopic – it offers glimpses and insights into complex matters from different 
angles, rather than a simple reflection. Yet we feel this better grasps the complex realities 
of these events than a simple picture ever could; it also reflects the very real challenges of 
researching our chosen topic, with its various political interests and ideologies still at work. 
The very idea of a ‘food riot’ warrants attention. Who decides when a protest is a food riot? And 
why apply that particular label? One conclusion we reached early on during this research is 
that the use of that label is itself a political act, primarily by the media – an intervention about 
a state, its people and the relations between them – more than a simple description of reality 
(see, for instance, Sneyd, Legwegoh and Fraser 2013). ‘The food riots that never were’ of the 
title refers to the ambiguities around the garments workers’ protests. But it also refers to the 
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relative absence of such protests. As we will see, there was a small number of relatively minor 
protests at this time, of which by far the most important were the garments workers’ protests 
of early to mid-2008, in terms of timing (they took place more or less simultaneously with 
comparable events in Haiti, Senegal and other low-income countries), scale, and in relation to 
the media and political attention they attracted. The present research uncovers four distinctly 
different views of these events.
•	 The international media framed these as ‘food riots’, with connotations of spontaneity, 
anger, hunger and violence.
•	 The Bangladeshi media and policy elite viewed these (in our view, quite reasonably and 
credibly) as protests against low wages, with the 2008 protests a continuation of the longer 
struggle for higher wages and better working conditions in general.
•	 Garments workers and their leaders took the view that their protests were centrally about 
wages and conditions, but that the rapid rise in the cost of food was vital to the struggle and 
a trigger for mobilisation at that particular moment. The slogan, ‘Dam komao, banchte dao’ 
(‘bring prices down, let us live’) was used. The Bangladeshi media focused on the wages, 
rather than the cost of living, aspect of the struggle.
•	 Our view is that most ‘food riots’ dissolve into their local political particularities when 
looked at closely. That is, ‘food riot’ is a term with an internationally recognised meaning, 
but in reality, few political events to which the term is applied meet the simple criteria 
of spontaneity, anger, hunger and violence in times of price spikes associated with the 
term: looked at closely, there are always other factors involved. The term ‘food riots’ was 
very likely just as applicable to the garments workers’ protests of April 2008 as to any 
other similar events. But these are more appropriately termed ‘subsistence protests’ and 
their political significance makes sense only in the context of their longer struggle over 
wages and conditions, and the interactions with industry and public authorities they have 
engendered. 
This paper puts the ambiguities around the 2008 garments workers’ protests at the heart of the 
analysis, but is not about those events alone, or even primarily. Instead, these are of interest 
because bringing their features into sharper focus takes a microscope to the dense, contentious 
politics of protest and policies around food – the biggest and most vital economic sector of all. 
As we will show below, the garments workers and the small number of other protests stand out 
as oddities at this time: protests of all kinds were banned under the military-backed unelected 
caretaker regime, but even then angry hungry people could have been expected to protest 
the unaffordability of food in their masses. They did not, and so the reasons why the garments 
workers did so, can help us to understand the rules, the norms, opportunities, motivations and 
meanings of food-related protests and the policy response at this time.  
Food rights and the moral economy 
The term ‘food riot’ is familiar from European social history, in particular seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century England and France. At moments of scarcity or high food prices, typically 
during periods when economies were adjusting towards more market-orientation and free 
market ideologies were in the ascendant, protests often erupted around what have come to 
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be known as ideas about the moral economy. The moral economy can best be summarised 
as a set of ideas about the right to subsistence even during crises, and the responsibilities 
of the public authorities to act to protect that right. European protesters often argued that the 
right to eat came before to the right to profit during moments of dearth, and they dramatised or 
enacted that right by seizing transported goods, preventing food exports, selling bread at ‘fair 
prices’ and so on. Moral economy ideas were characterised not only by their content – ideas 
about food rights at their heart – but also about their form: they were articulated as customary, 
the very basis of the legitimacy of rule, and they were only articulated at times when food 
rights were seen to be abrogated – they justified protests during moments of crisis, but more 
usually went unspoken, tacit, assumed. During crises when public authorities failed to act, 
moral economy norms or food rights could be invoked. Within Bangladesh, we found the idea 
of the moral economy was most usefully operationalised as ‘ideas about how [food] markets 
should work’. This implicitly introduces ideas about rights to food, to the extent that people 
believe markets should work in ways that are consistent with (and not opposed to) their rights 
to food.
2.2  Research design
Research questions
Across the parent project, we collectively structured our work with the following research 
questions:
A. To what extent did grievances about hunger and food price volatility feature in popular 
mobilisation in 2007–12?
What were the grievances?
How were grievances framed/articulated?
Who mobilised? 
When and how did mobilisations occur?B. To what extent were mobilisations between 2007–12 underpinned by ruptures in moral 
economies?
What do people expect of state and market with regard to food? 
What is the contemporary moral economy? What are its dynamics? How does 
it draw on history, memory and tradition? How does it vary among different 
groups?
Does the moral economy govern political life and political culture?
How does ‘globalisation’ impact on mobilisation, moral economy and political 
response?C. What was the political and policy response to mobilisations (or to perceived problems 
of hunger and food price volatility?
How was the country affected by food price volatility in 2007–12?
What was the nature and quality of response?
Did/does the policy/political response (whether to mobilisations or to perceived 
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problems of hunger and food price volatility) amount to increased institutional 
accountability for hunger?
Research components and research tools 
The research design took the form of three main components, each with their own research 
tools that were developed collectively and then adapted to each country context. These were: 
I Political events catalogue. This involved media content analysis. The overall approach 
to this was 
a. newspaper selection
b. a search protocol
c. development of a database to enable quantitative and qualitative analysis.
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In Bangladesh, this involved analysis of online and physical archives for the period 
2007–12 for three daily newspapers: the English language Daily Star, the Bangla 
Ittefaq and the Bangla Prothom Alo. Between them these comprise the most influential 
newspapers, including that with the highest circulation (Prothom Alo), and a spread 
across the political spectrum. A detailed description of the methodology, including 
design, search terms and process, and data management, of the political events 
catalogue is provided in the Annex.
 
II In-depth case studies of protests and protest communities. Partly on the basis 
of the political events catalogue and partly based on our prior knowledge and interviews with 
activists (see below), we selected two case studies of protests to study in more detail. One of 
these was rural, a case study of an ongoing local campaign for ‘fair markets’ in the poor north-
western district of Gaibandha. This overlapped with the period in question. Moral economy ideas 
and subsistence protests were involved, and so the case was selected as having the potential 
to shed light on the issues we were interested in. The second was the peri-urban industrial 
case of the garments workers’ protests in Savar, north of Dhaka. We give a description of each 
case below. To help us make sense of these case studies, we also undertook interviews with 
a small number of selected activists, national and local, with links to these protest groups. In 
researching these case studies, we used three main tools:
•	 ‘listening posts’, in which researchers identified public spaces in which relevant 
groups could be observed and local public discussions engaged in. This was to help 
us understand what people were talking about (before we entered with our research 
agenda) and to help us identify appropriate interviews and focus group participants;
•	 focus groups discussions, with prepared protocols, with groups of people who were 
known to have taken part in protests, or who were from the area and of the same 
social and occupational profile as people who participated in protests; 
•	 interviews with local key informants – journalists, leaders and activists, officials, etc. 
Case study 1: Readymade garments workers’ (RMG) struggles in Savar
The RMG case study was selected because industrial activism was the main, if not the 
only, type of event to which the label ‘food riot’ was conceivably applicable (although this is 
controversial). Apart from the routine and institutionalised campaigns of hartal by opposition 
parties and an emerging repertoire of hartal (an all-out strike) use by Islamist groups protesting 
against progressive policies on women during the period, there were few other significant forms 
of street or unruly politics (demonstrations, marches, riots etc.) during the period 2007–12.1 To 
understand the nature and content of popular mobilisation linked to the food price issue it was 
crucial to understand how the core element of the urban working class – the RMG workers in 
and around Dhaka city – were experiencing it and mobilising around it. Key relevant features 
of the RMG workers’ (ongoing) campaign for higher wages include that it has been closely 
connected to the food price rises: activists mobilised around a ‘living wage’ referring directly 
1  Note that the Shahbag mass movement supporting the war crimes trials and pro-secular causes more generally took place in 2013, after our 
time period ended. 
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to rapid rises in the cost of living and that workers’ wages failed to keep pace; the connection 
to food prices was particularly direct in the early stages of the campaign, and in fact pre-date 
our period (see IGS 2006). It has also been widely distributed across the industry, although its 
heartlands are the urban locations selected for the case study. The effects have been severe 
in terms of impact on human life, property, production and business, and national in terms of 
its implications: the RMG industry contributed 76 per cent of export earnings in 2008–9 (MoF 
2009) and as long ago as 2002 was estimated to earn 10 per cent of GDP (Bhattacharya, 
Rahman and Raihan 2002). The national significance of the RMG industry makes it possible for 
industry leaders to frame industrial disputes as a national emergency, because of the impacts 
on exports and the balance of payments. The campaign for wage increases, while ongoing at 
the time of writing, has also arguably had some successes: wages have risen; and the issue 
of how wages are set is on the policy agenda. 
Case study 2: the fair markets movement in Gaibandha
The ‘fair markets’ movement is far smaller and localised albeit in a reasonably large local 
market at the confluence of five villages in the poor under-developed north Bengal district of 
Gaibandha. Like the RMG wages movement, the fair markets movement is ongoing and:
•	 is connected to food and agricultural input price rises: small farmer and trader activism 
around market governance dates back to 2000, yet was re-invigorated during the period 
of the commodity price spikes; these groups feel squeezed both as producers and as 
consumers; 
•	 involves campaigns to tackle corruption in market governance, particularly in relation to 
illegal taxes or ‘tolls’ and other forms of unfair (and sometimes illegal) market practices such 
as hoarding; the movement thus mobilises around corruption and the local manifestations 
of patterns of politics and power that are national in their origins;
•	 has involved leftist political parties and social movements;
•	 has been unsuccessful in establishing its claims over the long term, despite short-term 
successes.
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Picture  The market committee office in Dariyapur, Gaibandha
Note: the market committee is ostensibly non-political, but note the party political poster 
propped up outside. 
The Gaibandha fair markets movement dates back more than a decade. In principle, 
the main actor is the Khudro Babshayi Shartho Shongrokhon Shomity (‘Committee for 
the protection of the interests of small businesspeople’ - KBSS), an association of small 
businessmen or traders in farm produce. The local krishak or farmer group has also been 
involved, and a closely associated struggle has been rice farmers’ mobilisation for ‘fair 
prices’ that took place in 2012 and was identified through the political events catalogue. 
The key events – major demonstrations, haat hartals (market strikes), violent responses and 
the use of ‘false cases’ by powerful groups – are concentrated in the 2007–8 period. While 
this may seem to confirm our starting assumptions that sharp food price rises would trigger 
popular mobilisation this does not appear to have been the direct cause of these events. 
This is because the period of the first food price spike (the lead up to mid-2008) coincided 
with the period of rule by the caretaker government (January 2007 to December 2008), and 
with a sharp break in the usual rules of governance, both economic and political. This was 
preceded and followed by periods of unusually high levels of extortion and abuse by the 
politically connected and party-aligned market committee leadership, who have party thugs 
to back them and the local administration often also aligned behind them. These patterns 
of governance created both the grievances and opportunities around which movement 
organisers could mobilise the frustrated small farmers and traders who bring their goods to 
the market for retail or wholesale. 
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III Policy response interviews. Finally, we interviewed a small number of carefully selected 
policymakers and experts, scholars and researchers. With these individuals our aims were 
to reconstruct the policy thinking and practice of the period, to gain a sense of what the 
motivations and understandings may have been, as part of our political economy analysis 
of how food security policies were made during the 2007–12 period, and why. These 
include officials in the Ministry of Food including high-level bureaucrats, technocrats in the 
Food Planning and Monitoring Unit (credited with much food policy responsiveness and 
innovation), relevant international donors in the food security/social protection field, some 
field-level officials, and researchers (because Bangladesh has a wealth of world class 
scholars on food and agricultural policy issues). The aims were to trace the sequence of 
events and to assess the influences on thinking and responses including the influence of 
the media, the interests and ideas underlying the responses, and the extent to which the 
outcomes have led to institutionalised responses in terms of political organisational and/or 
policy organisational or practice change.
2.3  Data and analysis 
The overall research approach has been to take into account multiple perspectives at different 
levels of the system, through analysis of different kinds of data, qualitative, quantitative, factual 
and subjective.
Data collection and data management
Data collection began by training the field research teams, experienced social scientists 
(anthropologists and sociologists) in the concepts and research design over several days. After 
brief scoping field visits and pre-tests of the research tools, fieldwork took place over three 
weeks during August to November 2013. The lead researchers (authors of the current paper) 
were involved in all aspects of the fieldwork. Interviews and focus groups were conducted in 
pairs to facilitate note-taking, and then transcribed in the language of the interview. These 
were then uploaded into NVivo 10 qualitative analysis software and coded using preset codes. 
Details of the political events catalogue are available in the annex.
Research ethics
A key concern in research of this nature is inevitably the safety and security of research 
participants and researchers. Our overall research design was checked by the IDS Research 
Ethics Committee. We explained the purpose of the research and sought permission for the 
use of data including images collected as part of this research. Where this has been requested, 
information provided during the research process has been removed from transcripts. Where 
requested, interviewees and focus group discussants have been anonymised. Where, as in 
the case of the Dariyapur fair markets struggle, the identities of the KBSS are a matter of public 
record (and indeed, they face criminal charges) anonymity was not requested. Public figures 
such as officials have been named, where this helped to triangulate the analysis. 
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3.  POPULAR MOBILISATION AND PROTESTS, 
2007–12: WHO, WHEN, HOW AND WHY
This section of the paper presents findings about the extent, form and distribution of popular 
mobilisation – riots, demonstrations, protests and civil society action – in which subsistence 
and/or the cost of living were a significant factor during 2007–12. It also looks at the ideological 
content or moral economy thinking around which groups mobilised, and the political opportunity 
structures within which these mobilisations took place, including the bases for collective action 
and the interactions between protesters and public authorities.
3.1 Measuring political action: challenges and limitations
The discussion which follows comes with a health warning: the process of constructing the 
political events catalogue has yielded important lessons about the challenges and limitations 
of measuring mass political action. First, there have been relatively few serious efforts to 
measure different kinds of unruly political events using any method, as  below suggests. 
Second, for Bangladesh (and almost certainly elsewhere) relying on media reports for raw data 
about political events means depending on sources which vary widely in terms of quality of 
reportage, inclusion and exclusion bias, interpretation and representation. This means that no 
single source is likely to be authoritative even of crude counts of events: for instance, the Daily 
Star (the main English language newspaper, selected as an authoritative source by at least 
one other credible study using political event counts2) was found to exclude many local political 
events covered by its sister Bangla language paper Prothom Alo and/or the established Bangla 
paper the Dainik Ittefaq. 
An interesting related pattern from the initial search of the international media was that national 
news media tended to identify events in other countries as food riots: within their own borders 
such events were more often framed as organised political events rather than spontaneous 
expressions of hungry anger. This suggests that the ‘food riots’ label is itself contentious and 
its use marks a political intervention in its own right and beyond national borders: arguably, 
within contemporary global political economy, being seen to have had ‘food riots’ signals a 
fundamental failure of governance.
Media biases in the inclusion and framing of the content of news reports are also important. 
This is most notable in the Bangladesh case in the interpretation of the garments workers’ 
protests: while activists and RMG workers emphasised the importance of the rising cost of 
living in driving their demands for wage increases, media coverage tends to exclude explicit 
mention of living costs in coverage of later episodes of industrial conflict. This means that the 
2  We refer here to the late Jalal Alamgir’s paper ‘Political Violence as a Core Governance Challenge’, presented to the IGS 40th Anniversary Con-
ference on Governance in Bangladesh in December 2011. http://igs-bracu.ac.bd/images/stories/40years/jalal%20alamgir.pdf [accessed 21 January 2014].
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extent to which food prices were included within the grievances of protesting workers is likely 
to have been underplayed. 
The limitations of the data collected for the political events catalogue include the possibility 
that relevant local political events are under-counted. The method used here overcame this by 
defining relevant events as those of relevance to national policy changes by virtue of having 
reached national policymaker attention through national press coverage. This was ensured by 
including analysis of three major papers, at least one of which is likely to be read by national 
policymakers and those who influence them. To avoid the possibility that different labels or 
terms may be applied to different events, search terms were broadly defined for the online 
archive searches and for the hand searches of physical archives.
3.2  The extent and distribution of popular action around food
Although Bangladesh is known for its unruly political culture, there have been few systematic 
efforts to measure protests, demonstrations, strikes, etc. While this would be enough to prevent 
us from gaining a sense of the relative importance of food-related popular action, it is further 
compounded by the fact that during the peak period of the food price spikes, 2007 and 2008, 
Bangladesh was under a state of emergency that banned political protest. This background is 
important for assessing the extent, distribution and nature of popular action around food during 
this period. 
In several respects Table 1 below gives a distorted picture of the distribution of unruly politics in 
Bangladesh. The origins of the now-ubiquitous hartal were in the anti-colonial uprisings of the 
first part of the twentieth century, and until the present, it is occasionally still used to express 
mass political grievances through non-institutionalised channels. But it is more regularly now 
part of routine party political competition; its main protagonists are professional politicians 
and their ‘cadres’ and paid supporters, not a mass support base (Suykens and Islam 2013). 
So the ubiquity of hartals specifically reflects the unruly nature of party politics rather than 
the prevalence of mass protests. By contrast, the figures on industrial conflict greatly under-
estimate its level and seriousness. To date there have been no notable efforts to measure or 
analyse the scale of the RMG industrial conflict, and the figures in Table 1 fail to convey a true 
sense of the numbers, scale or seriousness of the garments workers’ protests against low 
wages, rights abuses, unsafe working conditions and the cost of living since 2005. 
As the inadequacies of existing data on protest politics in Bangladesh are more likely to under- 
rather than over-estimate the universe of such protests (Alamgir 2011), it can be credibly 
argued that the total number of food-related events is likely to comprise a very small proportion 
of the total such actions during the 2007–12 period. Given the extent of poverty, hunger and 
vulnerability in Bangladesh, the direct nature of the transmission of the impacts of the 2008 food 
price spike on retail prices, and the predisposition towards unruly political action as suggested 
by Table 1, the relatively small numbers of food-related protests during periods of rapid price 
rises merits explanation.
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Table 1 Political event counts since the 1990s
Source/method Period Type of political 
event
Number of events 
(days)
(UNDP 2005) compiled from vari-
ous sources
1991–94
1995–98
1999–2002
Hartal 216
279
332
(Moniruzzaman 2009) compiled 
from national news sources 
1991–94
1995–98
1999–2002
Hartal 216
279
332
(Harrison 2013); no methodology 
detailed 
1991–96
1996–2001
2001–6
2009–12
Hartal 226
215
176
17
(Moniruzzaman 2009); compiled 
from (S.A. Islam 2006) based on 
a single national news source 
(Sangbad)
1991–2001 Political conflicts 2,423
(J. Alamgir 2011) compiled from 
Daily Star online searchable 
archives
2001–6 Political violence
of which:
‘Terrorism’
‘general political 
violence’
2,859
336
2,405
(Rahaman et al. 2011) based on 
unspecified media sources
August 2010–
January 2011
Industrial disputes 
(RMG)
30
Newspaper article cited in Daily 
Star (unruly politics in Bangladesh 
book chapter)
January–June 
2010
Industrial disputes 
(RMG)
5
Political events catalogue for pres-
ent study (2014)
Daily Star online archive
Prothom Alo online archive
Dainik Ittefaq
2007–12
2009–12
2007–12
Protests linked to food 
prices/ cost of living
28
56
86
Note: it is not clear whether the UNDP and Moniruzzaman use the same sources, but the hartal figures are identical. 
By our definition, there is likely to be a high degree of overlap between industrial disputes and cost of living protests.
3.3  Profile of subsistence protests, 2007–12
The relevant protests chiefly involved organisations of low paid wage workers, private and 
public sector, as well as some organised groups of informal sector farmers and self-employed 
groups, with civil society groups and political parties, particularly far-left groups (which are 
very small), taking up these issues to some extent. Table 2 lists all groups and organisations 
mentioned in all news articles about all types of political events related to protests or demand-
making relating to food in this period – riots, protests, demonstrations as well as organised civil 
society events (‘human chains’, petitions, roundtable discussions). Several points stand out: 
•	 food-related protests comprised a small proportion of political events;
•	 but such protests were more likely to occur when retail prices of basic foodstuffs were at 
their peak (see). That many of these occurred during the 2007–8 ban on political protest 
suggests that protesters were convinced of the seriousness and justice of their protests;
•	 the main political parties took up issues of the cost of living in the period, particularly 
22
THE FOOD RIOTS THAT NEVER WERE: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD SECURITY IN BANGLADESH
while they were in opposition. Food prices specifically reached the level of an issue within 
party political competition and became part – albeit not a major part – of the grievances of 
opposition parties. Both parties when in opposition led protests concerned with the rising 
cost of living;
•	 there was a small number of efforts by civil society groups to raise the issues of food prices 
(in particular);
•	 both civil society and party political protests were less common and less prominent than 
organised labour and worker welfare organisations;
•	 organised labour and worker welfare groups were by far the most prominent, with garments 
workers’ protests leading the fray: almost 40 per cent of all groups mentioned in relation to 
protests at this time were garments workers or their organisations (specifically).3 The next 
most important category were farmers and fishers and their welfare groups / councils, with 
almost one-fifth of all mentions. One-tenth were of other labour organisations including low 
paid public sector workers’ unions and groups. The rural poor, including destitute women 
and people affected by disasters or demanding relief comprised a mere 6 per cent of all 
mentions. 
Table 2 Protesters and petitioners as described in articles on political events
v Social movement / 
civil society groups  
Occupational groups  Trades unions/  
labour organisations 
Other 
Main parties 9 Consumer 
Association of 
Bangladesh 
2 Garments 
workers 
35 Worker welfare 
associations and 
councils 
13 Villagers/ 
poor 
people / 
destitute 
women 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
Leftist parties 
(CPB, DLA, 
RWPB) 
7 Student and 
cultural groups 
4 Farmers/ 
fishers 
17 Blue-collar 
labour unions/ 
federations 
9 
Local political 
representative
s  
4 Thinktanks 2 Economists 2 Bangladesh land 
port workers’ 
league 
1 
Parliamentary 
Committee on 
Food and 
Disaster 
Ministry 
1 Development 
NGOs 
2 intellectuals, 
professionals, 
journalists 
2 Garments 
workers 
27 
 Rajshahi 
Rakhya 
Songram 
Parishad 
2 fertiliser 
dealers 
1 Public sector 
worker unions/ 
organisations 
7 
employers and 
business 
associations  
3 agricultural 
land owners 
1 Coal miners  1 
local citizen 
groups 
2   
 21  17  58  57  10 
 
3  Media coverage of these events is sketchy, and predominantly frames them as demands for pay increases, with little to no mention of the rising 
price of food or the cost of living. This is despite the fact that RMG workers’ protests were linked to food prices in the international media (as noted above) 
and that primary research with garments workers and activists identified food and other cost of living rises as a major motivating factor. The absence of men-
tions of food costs in the reporting on garments workers’ protests will be analysed in more detail below.
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Note: this table takes the news article rather than the event as the unit of analysis. Figures used here are of citations 
for each time the group was mentioned and so provide a sense of how the events were covered in the media, not 
of the extent of activism by each group. 
For a regular newspaper reader, the impression of the distribution of the impacts of the food 
price rises is likely to have been that people on low wages – industrial workers, the urban 
working and lower middle classes – were most affected and most likely to protest. This is 
consistent with the findings from the policy response survey, in which policymakers and 
scholars commonly noted that people on fixed salaried or waged incomes were most directly 
hit by food price rises. By contrast, informal sector and daily wage workers were understood 
to be better-positioned to bid up their wages, at least in the short term, than industrial or public 
sector workers. 
The Daily Star’s reportage displays some urban bias, and fewer agriculture-related grievances 
were reported than in the Ittefaq. Agricultural input costs emerged as a key point of rural 
contention as fertiliser and irrigation fuel costs rose with food and other commodity prices 
in 2007–8 and again in 2010–11. In general, grievances blended a concern with both 
consumption issues – high prices, the improper regulation of the food retail trade, wages and 
worker benefits, social protection needs – and more structural or production concerns about 
economic development and governance, and the regulation of agricultural markets and the 
food wholesale trade. 
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Figure 3 The price of rice, and reported protest\s
Source: Rice price: Department of Agricultural Marketing, Bangladesh; events: political events catalogue, Food Riots project
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Note: the Prothom Alo archive starts from mid-2009; USD1: Bangladesh taka (BDT) 77.46 [as 
of 16th October 2014; source xe.com]
Protests about food were often connected to concerns about production, rather than merely 
consumption. This reflects the findings from the qualitative research of strong rural-urban 
connections within protesting groups, and a popular awareness including among the urban 
population, of farmer constraints and concerns. This means it makes little sense to view the 
political economy of food price rises as a contest between urban consumers and rural producers 
(as is often the case – see Swinnen 2011; Swinnen, Squicciarini and Vandemoortele 2011). 
Protests were overwhelmingly framed domestically, however, and there was no evidence that 
the global food economy or global policy were seen as either part of the problem or part of the 
solution to the problems people were experiencing.
In terms of targets, events covered in the Daily Star and Prothom Alo tended to identify national 
government, in particular the executive and line ministries (e.g. food) as the main objects of the 
protests. With its stronger focus on local events, protests covered by the Ittefaq also included an 
almost equal number of events in which local officials (sub-district and lower-level officials and 
elected representatives) were the targets. A handful of events were protesting corporations and 
large companies, including foreign investors (the China Contractual Authority). Fully one-third 
of all targets of protests mentioned in all the articles were garments factory owners and their 
association, the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA).
These findings about the grievances, demands and targets of protests derived from the 
political events catalogue are broadly consistent with the more in-depth work conducted in 
the case studies of the garments workers’ protests in Savar and the fair market movement 
in Gaibandha, as we will see in the next section. The key exception, as already noted, is the 
exclusion of considerations of food prices from the coverage of garments workers’ protests, 
which will be discussed further below.
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Figure 4 Repertoires of protest (in Bangla)
Source: Political events catalogue, Dainik Ittefaq archive
Bangla or Bengali has such a rich tradition and language of protest (in itself of some significance) 
that it makes sense to draw on the Bangla language descriptions of the events. Although many 
of them sound similar to each when translated into English, the different labels can signal 
quite distinct repertoires of political action to people familiar with street politics in Bangladesh. 
Figure 4 provides a basic count of the headline or main description given to the event in the 
newspaper, while Figure 5 does the same for the types of action named in the article (in some 
cases more than one action was mentioned). All are from the Dainik Ittefaq, which provided the 
relatively rich, local-focused archive of events. 
Reflecting the dominance of industrial conflict in the sample, the description of the events and 
the actions taken are substantially more often unruly and disruptive (demonstrations, agitations, 
sieges, marches/processions) than civil (hearings, human chains, memoranda, discussions, 
petitions). This pattern extends also to the violent nature of these events: in some 30 events, 
or more than one-third of the total, vandalism of factories or vehicles and threats of violence 
occurred. The impression received from the news coverage is also that these were usually 
unorganised events – riots and agitations rather than organised lobbying or civil action: out of 
84 events, 47 were described in terms that suggested spontaneity and lack of organisation, 
and 36 were characterised as organised or planned events. 
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Figure 5 Types of action described
Note: n=95
Source: Political events catalogue, Dainik Ittefaq archive
3.4  Patterns of protest in the case studies
The RMG workers’ protests
The first major protest events took place in the export processing zone (EPZ) in 2002, followed 
by events in 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010 and 2012 both in and outside the EPZ. From our interviews 
and discussions with activists, participants and workers who observed these events, these 
were largely spontaneous protests in which the central demand was increased wages and 
benefits, as well as payment of due wages and benefits. It should be noted that our research 
indicates that there are likely to have been many such protests, and those we detail here are 
not exhaustive of the actions during this time, even in this industrial area. They reflect the first-
hand knowledge and experiences of the people we met who were willing to tell their stories. 
Note that it was not difficult to find people who had such experiences in this area, but many 
were reluctant to discuss them with outsiders. Below we provide a timeline of these events in 
order to glean lessons about their patterns, trends and implications. 
Prior to the period of interest (2007–12), the workers in this area had already acquired a great 
deal of experience mobilising around wages and conditions, and had had some success in 
doing so, both in and outside the EPZ. In 2002 and 2004, large-scale protests took place 
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in and outside the EPZ. During protests over wage rises and against illegal termination of 
workers4 in 2002, five workers were shot dead by the Ansars (a quasi-official law enforcement 
agency usually contracted to provide industrial policing and security services). The struggle 
for compensation and medical care for the victims spread across other factories in the area. 
The protests continued for 20 to 25 days. No major political parties supported the workers but 
they eventually succeeded, winning wage increases, although the compensation was smaller 
than they had demanded. In the same area, in 2004, another struggle took place, this time 
with the main demand of no illegal sacking of workers. In one sweater factory, a demand was 
made to start a trade union. The police and local mastaans, or gangsters, were called in to put 
organisers off, after which they learned to organise and discuss outside the factory walls. A 
missil, or demonstration, was organised to enter the factory, after which a workers’ organisation 
was permitted. The organisation or trade union enjoyed some successes in securing workers’ 
basic rights in that factory over a period. 
A key set of protests occurred in 2006 around raising the minimum wage, which in the EPZ 
was then BDT930 (basic monthly rate; now worth around $12). This struggle was large in scale 
and spread rapidly through the EPZ. On this occasion, leftist political organisations were in 
support of the movement, although the two main parties (Awami League and BNP) were not. 
However, the workers adopted non-violent means, with participants from that time recalling 
that they did not want to destroy the factory from which they earned their living. Attacks on 
factories, incidents of arson and other violent action were not, in their view, carried out by 
garments workers but by ‘outsiders’. After the 2006 protests, the minimum wage was raised to 
BDT1,662.
Until 2007, the workers’ protests in this area were self-organising, without any external 
actors involved. After 2007, their mobilisation began to gain the support of workers’ rights 
organisations, leftist coalitions and groups, and activist and civil society organisations, many 
with roots in the garments workers’ struggles. Through this engagement, their repertoires 
widened to dialogue with factory owners and industry leaders, information campaigns through 
leafleting about workers’ demands, and (peaceful) human chains. 
Even when these new actors came on the scene, however, our informants noted that the main 
source of mobilisation remained through the factory, particularly the leadership of experienced 
‘in-charge’ workers who commanded workers’ respect. When an action was decided upon, 
the people in charge would tell a larger group of workers, who would then spread the word 
by mobile phone and other means. In other factories, according to other informants, even this 
relatively flat leadership was absent, and groups decided on actions without clear leadership. 
In the last few years, leadership in the non-EPZ factories shifted more towards workers in the 
knitwear as opposed to the garments factories.5 
4  Labour laws on the termination of employment (including conditions, notice, pay etc.) are rarely followed, and protests are common; abrupt 
factory closures to avoid having to make severance or other payments are common.
5  It is not generally known outside Bangladesh that the industry has at least two distinct parts: knitwear and garments (often also known as 
cut-and-make or cut-make-trim – CMT). The key distinction for our purposes is that the knitwear part of the industry has always involved heavier machinery, 
and has always employed a larger proportion of men than the garments/CMT industry. The implication is that young men are more easily mobilised than 
young women, and it may indeed be the case that the rise in industrial disputes since the advent of the knitwear industry (which is newer than the garments 
sub-sector) owes to matters of gender in relation to protest. The knitwear sub-sector also has its own association – the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufactur-
ers and Exporters Association (BKMEA). Other important differences in the labour patterns of the two sub-sectors include that knitwear workers are paid 
on piece-rates, and their work is seasonal. Knitwear workers argue that their rights are more easily abrogated, and that garments workers benefit from the 
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By 2007, workers in this area were accustomed to taking to the street and/or factory-based 
action. Actions in 2009, 2010 and 2012 are seen by workers in the area as relatively spontaneous 
and unorganised responses to the growing inadequacy of wages during a period of rapid price 
rises. Actions that started in one factory quickly spread to others, as news of wage increases 
were shared. In addition, ‘the movement’ was sporadic and stop-start and never sought a 
long-term solution to their problems: direct action stopped whenever a raise was realised, and 
re-started when the increased wages were found to be inadequate.
Workers stressed that industrial action enjoyed little to no meaningful party political support: 
the main parties rarely joined protests and although the small leftist political parties joined 
in actions later during the period, they played no significant role in organising workers. The 
garments workers involved in this research consistently expressed distrust of political parties 
of all stripes, generally taking the view that there was a mutual lack of interest between the 
workers’ struggle and party politics. One woman worker during a focus group discussion with 
non-active workers in Bhadail said: ‘the leaders of these parties were bought by the garments 
owners and you know what, the price is really cheap and all you need to give them is a bottle 
of wine’ (12 July 2013).
A male worker in a focus group with (non-active) male garments workers in Ashuliya said: ‘We 
do not believe in banners (of political parties) – that will compromise our movement’ (23 July 
2013).
The view that party political actors were unimportant, absent or unwelcome is telling. One 
reason is that RMG factory ownership cuts across the Bangladeshi political elite. More than half 
(57 per cent and 56 per cent respectively) of members of the 2001–6 and 2008–13 parliament 
reported ‘business and industry’ as their major occupation; the dominance of the RMG sector 
in business and industry means that a high proportion of MPs are likely to have interests in the 
garments industry (Hossain 2014).
Mainstream political parties are unlikely to take on an issue that hurts their leadership so 
directly, or in which arguably neither has a strong political advantage. Second, the idea that 
leftist political groups are in essence thugs for hire is the mirror-image of the suspicion outside 
the workers’ struggle, that outsiders (probably Indian spies) have infiltrated protest movements 
to manipulate workers to push wages up and reduce Bangladesh’s competitive edge. Both 
views betray a conspiratorial view of industrial politics as a venal business in which nothing is 
as it seems. These views about the roles of party politics sit alongside a popular aversion to 
violent protest as opposed to the interests of the industry and national economic advancement 
more generally, and some considerable sympathy among non-elite groups with the struggle, in 
recognition that wages have been low and costs of living have risen.6 
The targets of protests have shifted slightly over time. At first, and still now, these were mainly 
individual factory owners. Later, and as other actors came on the scene in supporting roles, 
successes of the knitwear workers’ protests. 
6  Some of these points are elaborated in N. Hossain (2014).
29
POPULAR MOBILISATION AND PROTESTS,  2007–12: WHO, WHEN, HOW AND WHY
the targets shift towards public authorities, occasionally the industry leadership and relevant 
regulatory agencies. Despite the presence of some established leftist groups (such as the 
workers’ wing of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal and the Communist Party of Bangladesh) RMG 
workers’ protests did not noticeably make common cause with other urban groups on fixed low 
incomes (such as other industrial or low paid service sector workers in the public or private 
sector). The protests may have sometimes been framed in terms of subsistence rights, but in 
their early days, they almost universally targeted factory owners for wage rises. Later they took 
on wider agendas such as the cost of living (a concern shared by other factory workers, and 
others outside the industry) and the minimum wage, as well as basic labour standards (mainly 
allowances and conditions).
Some protests as well as more civil society activism also included the demand for Open Market 
Sales7 (OMS) within factories. This was necessary because OMS grains are usually sold during 
working hours so that factory workers were excluded from this source of cheap food. During 
2009 and 2010 OMS was temporarily introduced within factories, but as the scheme targets 
beneficiaries by requiring them to queue, the scheme worked imperfectly for factory workers; it 
was later discontinued. Although unlikely to have been an important policy in terms of numbers 
reached, grains sold or price stabilisation effects, the deployment of OMS in factories was 
nevertheless very important. This is because it signalled a shift in how garments workers were 
viewed, suggesting that their rights to food security were recognised as equivalent to those of 
other urban citizens, and that special steps were being taken to ensure their access was the 
same as any other citizen, by taking into account their particular modes of work and working 
hours. This makes the introduction of OMS in factories highly symbolic: the specific needs of 
industrial workers were recognised, and the responsibility or mandate for enabling their access 
to affordable food grains was accepted by the state.
Some final points about these struggles as recounted to our research teams: 
•	 Protests can spread very rapidly across factories, regardless of whether they were in the 
EPZ or not; this is very likely due to the fact that workers live in the neighbouring areas, 
and many change jobs and so have networks across the industry, along which affiliations 
may be built and communications channelled. Although it is highly dangerous to do so, it 
is not difficult for RMG workers in the Savar/Ashulia area to mobilise significant numbers 
of fellow workers.
•	 Actions spread and escalate in response to violence; a large number of small, peaceful, 
factory-level forms of resistance are reported to occur. In the majority of instances of 
industrial disputes, workers and managers, sometimes involving owners, negotiate 
settlements quickly and quietly.
•	 There is very limited evidence of actors external to the sector becoming involved other than 
7  OMS is a national scheme selling rationed subsidised grains in urban areas (usually 5kg per person / household per day) with the aim of 
stabilising grain prices and ensuring affordable access. The programme is self-targeting because the grain quality is often low and travel and queuing time 
ensures only those who really need it buy the grain. In April 2009, a full year after the international press reported the garments workers’ ‘food riots’, the 
government, in collaboration with the BGMEA, announced it would be trialling OMS sales in factories; shortly after it announced it reduced the price further 
in line with dropping market prices (the rice price had fallen steeply by mid-2009). The scheme started in August 2009 but by November, the newspapers 
were reporting that ‘the government’s much-expected food-rationing programme for readymade garment workers (RMG) went into hibernation apparently 
for factory owners’ indifference toward it.’ The Daily Star, 14 November 2009; ‘Food rationing for RMG workers stalled: Hardly 5,000 benefited so far though 
owners pledged to cover 6.5 lakh initially’ http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=114018 [accessed 23 November 2014]. Equally 
likely is that the drop in the price of rice at this time pushed demand down, but it is not clear why the scheme was not revived, nor whether there were 
demands for it to be revived, during the 2011 price spike.
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the police and, in a minor way, local leftist groups. Even political parties keep out of these 
struggles, except, it is said, when their local strongmen are recruited to protect factory 
owners against protesting workers.
•	 The repertoire has not evolved far over the decade. Actions appear to start locally and 
peacefully but escalate to factory-level violence in response to repression or perceived 
failures by factory owners to act. Other actions with a wider impact intended to reach a 
higher or larger target than factory owners include efforts to influence public opinion and to 
negotiate with industry leaders through information campaigns and dialogue. In addition, 
more recent direct means have been in the form of road blockages.
Also of direct relevance to the present argument is while the protesters and workers who had 
not participated in protests freely discussed their grievances about the cost of food and other 
basic subsistence costs (rent being a particular current concern), these were subsidiary to 
the core purpose of the struggles themselves. These were to realise their rights as workers 
to a liveable wage, and adherence to basic employment conditions. So while the food crisis 
featured, it was not the primary object or the substance of their protests. 
The Gaibandha ‘fair markets’ campaign
The Gaibandha ‘fair markets’ campaign case shares several features with the RMG workers’ 
protests. It is an ongoing struggle between the Committee for the Protection of the Interests 
of Small Business Owners (KBSS), supported and organised by the local branch of the 
Communist Party of Bangladesh, and local market leaseholders, relatively affluent and well-
connected business owners who enjoy strong party political backing from both of the main 
parties. The roots of the struggle date back to around 2000, but have largely been over the 
rightful rents or charges for the use of the marketplace throughout. At times this has featured 
strong and, at moments, highly effective resistance by the small farmers and vendors who use 
this large central market, to the illegal tolls or taxes on sales, leasehold arrangements, and 
other services imposed by the politically powerful leaseholders. 
Initial events were spearheaded by the Gaibandha Commnist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) (and 
leftist allies), and included the 2004 suspension of the Union Parishad chairman on corruption 
charges. In 2006 the small farmer-traders in the area began to mobilise alongside the CPB, 
who supported their effort to organise around a protest against a toll or illegal tax on seeds. In 
2007 the newly organised KBSS with the CPB managed to organise a demonstration against 
illegal marketplace charges. The delivery of a petition to the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (the 
chief executive of the sub-district administration, and a very powerful indvidual) triggered an 
investigation that, allegedly due to political interference, failed to hold anyone to account. 
In 2008, during the caretaker government and at the peak of the first price spike, the KBSS 
again with CPB support bid for and won the lease of the market. For the first time in local 
history, the market was not being run by politically connected business people, but by the small 
farmers and traders who comprised the majority of the market users. Their management of the 
market was allegedly a success; there were no complaints of corruption or excess tolls during 
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the period, and large profits were made and declared in a public meeting at which they were 
distributed among the cooperative members. Politically connected thugs attacked the meeting, 
and in the melee, several people were injured. Several members of the KBSS were arrested 
and some served time in jail (and now face further charges).
This last event took place under the new democratically elected government. Supporters of 
the ruling party then won the tender for the market lease in 2009. Since 2010, the jailed KBSS 
participants have been out on bail, but they and their CPB comrades and families face continual 
threats and ‘psychological warfare’ from activists from the two main parties (whom, it should be 
noted, have acted in concert against the KBSS and the CPB over this).
 
The repertoire used here has included haat hartals, or strikes of the weekly market, an 
impressive organisational effort in this agricultural market, which sits at the crossroads of five 
villages (and is relatively far from any major towns). In addition, there have been demonstrations 
and marches, petitions, and engagement with high-ranking officials. Some efforts have been 
made to engage the media on their side, and it is was through media reportage that this case 
came to our attention. 
The case is of considerable interest for a number of reasons. For present purposes the profile 
of the protests differ from the other subsistence protests recorded, primarily in that the far left, in 
this case the Communist Party of Bangladesh, played an effective and (in the eyes of the small 
farmers and traders who comprise its supporters) positive role. There is a strong suspicion that 
many leftist groups have turned from militancy to organised crime (perhaps particularly in the 
south of the country). However, in this case, their agenda appears to be genuinely supportive of 
relatively poor and powerless rural people. The research for the case study found that the food 
price rises were an important part of the context in which their struggles became more acute, 
but, as with the garments workers, they were not or were not obviously an important trigger. 
The Gaibandha fair market campaign shares the following features with the other subsistence 
struggles of the period in:
•	 avoiding engagement with national party politics, and viewing political corruption as a key 
part of the problems they face;
•	 articulating a clear moral position on the fairness of markets (on which more below);
•	 connecting the abilities of producers to earn a fair living with that of consumers to pay fair 
prices;
•	 expecting an appropriate official response in terms of enforcing rules already in place.
•	 Also like the RMG workers, the Gaibandha campaign pre- and post-dated the 2007–12 
period. It also faced violent repression by actors backed by political power, as well as the 
judicial and law enforcement arms of the state itself. 
3.5  Why and how people protested: moral economies and the 
politics of provisions 
We turn now to a closer look at the nature and content of protests in this period, initially 
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through an exploration of the ideological or mobilising content of the RMG workers’ struggles 
for wage increases in the Dhaka sub-district of Savar, a byword for industrial activism; and 
the ‘fair markets’ campaign in the northern district of Gaibandha, involving small farmers and 
traders and the Communist party. Our inquiry sought to understand the legitimating notions 
motivating the protests, including ideas about how markets should operate, and visions of the 
good life or the social order, as well as diagnoses of market failure and mis-governance. We 
conceptualised the idea of ‘moral economy’ as ‘ideas about how markets ought to (be made to) 
work’. We did not translate the concept for our respondents but asked them to describe how 
food markets worked and were governed; to describe what had been happening in local food 
markets in recent years, including with respect to price changes and how that was influencing 
change in their own lives; and to discuss how the governance of markets should be achieved. 
In both cases, conditions in retail food markets provided activating context for the protests, 
but they were not the central grievance in either: the struggle was for fair wages (in a context 
of rapid consumer cost increases driven by commodity price rises, understood to be partly 
the result of political corruption and weak governance) or for fair markets (in a context of 
rapid consumer and producer cost increases, again causally linked to corruption and weak 
governance).
The ideas underpinning these struggles are cast in a moral idiom, but the specific issues 
in contention are firmly part of a distinctively Bangladeshi politics of provisions. The arc of 
the narrative they describe tends to contrast how markets (in food, agricultural inputs and to 
a certain extent, labour) operate against an understanding of people’s entitlements; these 
entitlements are in turn founded in an understanding of the social order or ‘the good life’ (of 
how society should be organised). 
Fair price / value / fair wages
At the heart of the ideology being expressed through these protests is a concept of ‘fair value’; 
the concept is similar to ‘fair price’ and can be directly translated so). The concept was applied 
both to the prices earned by producers of food but also to the prices charged to consumers. 
In one focus group discussion of male workers in the EPZ, an equivalent concept of a ‘fair 
wage’ was also applied to refer to the rightful returns to labour, and the ideas of a ‘fair lease’ 
(rent, perhaps?) and of ‘fair entitlements’ were also used. It should be noted that the concept 
was most often used by the Communist Party activists, members and their supporters in rural 
Gaibandha; it was plainly a term they used with great ease. However, the urban RMG activists, 
factory workers who did not identify as politically active, shopkeepers, market stallholders 
and small traders also used similar concepts. That is, although the politically active left was 
most prominent in the use of the specific term, it was clearly present in the discourse of other 
politically aware (if not leftist activist) groups. The sense of the term also features among some 
progressive civil society groups and thinktanks such as the Centre for Policy Dialogue.8
8  In 2013, the Centre for Policy Dialogue shared results from research on what the minimum wage for readymade garments workers should be 
according to International Labour Organization standards. They conclude that BDT8,200 would be the correct level, and that as an interim measure it could 
be set at 80 per cent, or BDT6,500 (Moazzem and Raz 2014). These figures are above the current minimum wage, which as of December 2013 was set 
for the lowest grade of machine operator at BDT5,300 (including basic pay and all allowances). It should be noted that CPD is the leading thinktank and 
research institute in Bangladesh, and widely considered both technically credible as well as engaged with policy processes and debates. So these ‘living 
wage’ estimates have been treated with respect. 
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Both rural and urban people spoke of farm-gate prices as wrong, unfair or inadequate because 
of: 
•	 rising input costs, particularly the cost of fertiliser, which meant farmers did not earn the 
right return on their hard work in the fields, as the prices producers received did not reflect 
rising input costs; and/or
•	 the role of market intermediaries, and their manipulation of the timing of market transactions. 
This manipulation meant farmers were forced to sell to traders at moments when prices 
were at their lowest, in order to repay pressing debts (sometimes owed to the same people). 
OI, a 46-year-old farmer and local CPB functionary explained that:
The main point is that here farmers don’t get fair value. When we plant our rice 
crop then it’s BDT500 per maund9 and at selling time we get BDT450. Now [X 
months later – the height of what used to be the hungry season] it is BDT850. 
When we farmers are selling our dhan [unprocessed rice crop] we are selling it 
all off at BDT450. We have to pay our field labourers, pay for fertiliser, pay for oil 
[fuel for irrigation]. 
OI also described an incident that had occurred to one of his comrades: he had gone to Dariyapur 
bazaar to sell 20kg of paddy to cover household expenses. But of the 20 or so wholesalers 
in the bazaar, not one would buy his grain, presumably because of unfair trade agreements 
among the market lease-holders designed to keep farm-gate prices low. OI concluded: ‘The 
ordinary folk are not getting fair value/price. Farmers are losing their land [as a result].’ In this 
way, the season-by-season failure to achieve a reasonable return or fair price becomes part of 
a larger pattern of exploitation in which a process of landlessness is accelerated.
The idea of a fair price for consumers was less clearly articulated, but it had a ready referent 
in the form of fair price outlets – shops selling publicly subsidised grains.10 Because the 
government buys and sells food in such a way to influence food prices on behalf of its citizens 
establishes the idea that it can and should set a fixed price or control prices that people can 
afford to pay. Among the many responsibilities of government with regard to food policy, price 
controls were widely agreed upon. In discussion it emerged that this most often meant literal 
controls on retail prices with official prices published on a board in the market place. This would 
protect both the consumer and the small trader from sudden price hikes and illegal taxes. 
Faith in the power of official signage to create transparency around prices seemed strong 
both in the rural and the urban area. This was particularly important to traders in the Dariyapur 
bazaar, and was seen as of key importance to the small traders and farmers who sell their 
produce there. BM, an 80-year-old seller of limes in the Dariyapur bazaar, supported the need 
for a chart specifying wholesale and retail prices with official tax rates on each item, adding 
9  An Asian unit of weight, approximately 37kg.
10  This is now chiefly the OMS system described above. However, when in effective power during the 2007–8 CTG, the army established a set of 
separate outlets to reach the poor. Older respondents (anyone over 40) will recall the Public Food Distribution system, comprising rations for civil servants 
and other urban population groups and the Trading Corporation of Bangladesh outlets. Most of this system favoured the urban middle classes, most 
famously and tragically during the 1974 famine. As part of the public sector reforms of the early 1990s, the BNP government that took power in the first 
multi-party elections, phased most of these out as part of broader food system reforms, replacing them to some extent with food- and later cash-transfer 
schemes targeted to the rural poor. Several of the contributions in Ahmed, Haggblade and Chowdhury (2000) describe this period in some detail.  
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in outrage, ‘A poor public [a member of the public] goes to sell their goods and they take an 
additional 2 taka tax!’ 
A few workers used the term ‘fair wage’ but a broader concept to which it seemed to refer – a 
wage that afforded a decent living standard including scope to invest in the future – was also 
articulated. MH, a married 40-year-old textile dying factory worker based in the EPZ in Savar, 
explained that: ‘Now the ongoing movement (andolon) is for fair wages. If government were to 
give those fair wages we would see that everywhere people could meet their needs.’
The idea of a fair price or a fair wage refers to a social order in which people are able to manage 
their needs to a reasonable standard of living. People referred frequently to the kinds of foods 
they were unable to afford now which in the past they had eaten (or thought they should be 
able to eat). This was partly about affording the basics, and some people referred to nutritional 
needs in various ways. But it was also about culturally preferred foods: a small food trader 
in the EPZ in Savar noted for instance, that in this month of Ramadan he was unable to buy 
dates, which are a relatively luxurious imported item, but it is customary to break the fast with a 
date, forging a connection to the Middle Eastern origins of Islam. In Savar, it was common for 
RMG workers to talk about how rising living costs made it difficult for them to remit money to 
their families in the village – to do so is not only a source of pride but also an important source 
of support for ageing parents, expected of men in particular. Also important to the quality of life 
is the quality of food people eat: people spoke about not feeling confident that the food they 
can afford to buy is safe, in a context of widespread fears of adulterated food.
By referring to ideas about the quality of life that needs to be enabled through the food system, 
these moral economy ideas link to a specific set of understandings of the social order. These 
illustrate some of the specifically Bangladeshi quality of the politics of provisions. This is 
revealed first in the sense that those who break the moral rules of the food system tend to 
be outsiders to the moral community. This was articulated in various ways, but in the rural 
community in Gaibandha there was a sense that exploitative market intermediaries were often 
outsiders – newcomers to the area or people who live outside the local community, or were 
from non-farming backgrounds. For the RMG workers, they were themselves the outsiders, 
even when they had lived in the industrial zone for many years. In effect, they lacked strong 
moral ties to market traders, and their relationships were purely those of market transactions.
This suspicion of outsiders connects to a wider Bangladeshi suspicion of commerce and trade 
linked to the historical association of economic exploitation with non-Bengali or non-Bengali 
Muslim backgrounds. This is not unusual in post-colonial nations, but it is particularly noticeable 
in Bangladesh. Part of the nationalist struggle here was a struggle against exploitation by 
outsiders (particularly in relation to land, agriculture and food systems); membership of the 
national moral community continues to be linked to matters of ethnicity and social origins. This 
is why when contemporary protests are framed in terms of exploitation by outsiders, there are 
echoes of the protracted three-staged nationalist political struggle – first against the British, 
second against the Hindu landowning classes of East Bengal, and finally against (West) 
Pakistan (N. Hossain 2005). The ironies of contemporary exploitation, given the sacrifices of 
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the nationalist struggle, were highlighted by a 40-year-old male factory worker:
So, they who are working are dying from starvation, and those who are not 
working, they are making crores of taka11 becoming factory owners. It would have 
been better not to be citizens in this free country but to have stayed living in 
Pakistan. 
The social order is also underpinned by an understanding of the moral community as connecting 
the interests of rural and urban people. This had some unexpected consequences. While RMG 
workers are excluded from the moral community of their urban locations, both they and the 
rural farmers and traders presented their own concerns as consumers (purchasers) of food as 
directly and causally connected to the interests of producers and small traders. There is no 
sense of opposed interests: a conventional policy analytical framework in which the interests of 
urban consumers are contrasted with rural producers fails to make sense of the relationships 
embedded in the moral economy here. Urban industrial workers spoke knowledgeably and 
sympathetically about the concerns of farmers and indeed small traders; the idea of a fair price 
for consumers was not antithetical to the idea of a fair price for producers, but was part of the 
same moral economic principle. The perceived continuity between rural and urban interests in 
relation to the food economy makes sense both symbolically – a rural farming life continues to 
be seen as morally superior to urban life and occupations – and also in the lived experience 
of many urban people, particularly recent migrants from rural areas like many RMG workers.12 
Many RMG workers continue to depend on or support farming activities in their home districts; 
for knitwear workers this can be particularly important as their contracts are typically seasonal. 
There is a degree of fluidity and mobility in the movement between rural and urban life and 
occupations that reflects the recent rapid nature of economic development in Bangladesh. It 
also reflects its geography and the lack of significant social differentiation that in other countries 
bar movement between regions or occupations. 
Responsibilities of the state
In the ideas expressed by these people about how markets should operate, the state is 
assigned a key role in assuring that people can afford to achieve the quality of life essential to 
their wellbeing. The state has a role at several different levels, but the role is prescribed within 
the realm of what people believe to be politically feasible. The state is held responsible for 
basic regulatory as well as protective functions, including: 
•	 protecting consumers against sudden undue price rises resulting from collusive market 
practices, through for instance, enforcing marketplace regulations on transparency about 
prices and taxation;
•	 ensuring access to food through fair price shops and social protection schemes;
11  A crore is 10 million; crores of taka suggests unimaginable amounts of money. 
12  It is no coincidence that many RMG workers in the Savar area are themselves from the northern regions, including Gaibandha 
district. This reflects the historically high levels of chronic and seasonal hunger in those regions. In other more prosperous parts of the country 
(the east in particular) international labour migration is more common. For the poorer and less well-networked northerners, migration to Dhaka for garments 
work appears to have been more feasible. Our sample of interviewed RMG workers comprised a significant proportion of people claiming origins in the 
greater Rangpur region. 
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•	 regulating market intermediaries so that producers achieve farm-gate prices that reflect 
costs of production, and are not exploited through unfair financing arrangements;
•	 supporting producers through subsidised agricultural inputs or protection against commodity 
price spikes; 
•	 protecting workers against exploitation by factory owners – failure to pay legal wages and 
benefits and other labour rights.
While the state is assigned such responsibilities, a specifically Bangladeshi aspect of the 
politics of provisions is the lack of faith in the state’s capacity to deliver. This lack of faith is 
rooted in the sense that political corruption shapes most aspects of economic governance: 
•	 at national level: party and patronage politics are seen to enable food grain cartels;
•	 in industry: partisan control of police and party mastaans, or gangsters, are connected to 
efforts to break industrial action;
•	 in local markets: party membership is connected to lease-holding, and to support from local 
government in attacks on fair markets movement activists including use of violence and 
legal cases against CPB and KBSS activists.
The control by ruling parties and their national organisational structures marks the politics of 
provisions in this context, and gives a specific form to the ideological motivations underlying 
these struggles. In this sense, the politics of provisions are an attempt to craft a politics that is 
beyond and above party politics, in a context in which the party is increasingly all-encompassing 
in both political and economic life and governance. 
Summary: The politics of provisions in Bangladesh, 2007–12
This extended analysis of the subsistence protests seen in Bangladesh during 2007–12 
has examined their numbers, motives, organisational means and repertoires. We have 
established that protests relating to subsistence were few in number, compared to the scale 
and prevalence of contentious politics in Bangladesh, and the likely severity of the impact 
of sharp food price rises. Through our case studies we have been able to examine at close 
quarters the organisational strategies and thinking behind such action. We conclude that the 
evidence supports the assumption that the small numbers of protests were by groups who 
were particularly hard hit by the food price rises because of how their occupation exposed 
them to price volatilities (of agricultural inputs and consumer prices). These groups had clear 
ideas about their subsistence rights, and about the responsibilities of official actors. In many 
cases, they had clear ideas about who should act, and what they should do. That there were 
some strong areas of consensus on these issues indicates that these are more widely shared 
within the Bangladeshi moral community. 
However, the groups who protested also all had opportunities to organise, because of their 
workplace locations and/or because they were already organised by the time of the food price 
spikes. Indeed, the specific triggers for their action during this time were relevant matters, such 
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as corruption or abuse of workers’ rights, which were deemed particularly outrageous at a time 
when living costs were climbing. Arguably, the peak in food prices was the moment at which 
an already simmering anger came to the boil. 
It is also clear from the profile of protests from the political events catalogue and from those 
described in our case studies that protesters are demanding action – not only from central 
government, but also from local authorities (market and factory officials, for instance). They 
have a certain level of expectation that makes their protests rational: these are not spontaneous 
acts of untargeted anger, but pointed statements of need and rights. 
The conclusion we draw from this analysis is that a smaller number of protests took place than 
we would expect given the extent of need, but that these groups were able to organise, had 
clear rationales for doing so, and expected action in response. In other words, this has the 
appearance of a functioning politics of provisions, in that people facing subsistence crises are 
able to make their claims in the expectation that they will elicit a response. We look next at the 
nature of the policy and political response to the price spike. 
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4.  POLICY AND POLITICAL RESPONSES
This section discusses the policy and political responses to the food price volatility of 2007–12, 
focusing on the reactions and policy changes in light of the 2008 food crisis. We look first at 
the policy context, then at how policies get made in Bangladesh, and finally at how food policy 
changed during this period.
4.1  Relevant political context of the 2008 price spike
In the first two years of the research period, 2007 and 2008, during the first major food price 
spike to be experienced since the 1970s, Bangladesh was ruled by an unelected military-
backed caretaker government (CTG - January 2007 to December 2008). This had some 
constitutional basis in the provision for a caretaker administration to oversee elections, but had 
been extended in 2007–8 with the backing of the international community on the grounds that 
political corruption had reached such an intolerable level that free and fair elections could not 
be achieved without a period of governance reform (IGS 2008; BRAC University and Institute 
of Governance Studies 2009) Overlapping almost perfectly with this period of unelected rule 
was the 2008 food price spike, so that the unelected military-backed administration was tasked 
with tackling an unprecedentedly rapid rise in the price of staple food grains of rice and wheat 
(the latter less important to the food economy but relied on by poorer people in particular (see 
Figure 1). 
One feature of the 2007–8 period was the clampdown on political protest under national 
emergency conditions. This was chiefly targeted at organised party actions, but officially all 
demonstrations were prohibited. Nevertheless, as Section 3 documented, a small number of 
protests and demonstrations related to food and the cost of living did take place during this 
period, and up to 2012. Arguably, on close inspection, none of these were ‘food riots’ in any 
accepted sense of the term; however, the international media fingered Bangladesh as one 
of the countries in which food riots had occurred in the wave of such events said to have 
occurred in low-income countries in 2008. The dominant form of protest in the entire period 
2007–12 was sporadic yet numerous RMG factory worker protests for wage rises and benefits. 
In the early part of this period, when food prices were rising fast and particularly sharply, these 
protests were directly connected to food prices, with protest slogans including ‘dam komau, jan 
bachao’ (‘lower prices, save our lives’). Later, as rising and high food prices became routine 
(and perhaps for other reasons), the grievances and demands were framed more specifically 
around wages and benefits. A small number of other protests also occurred, chiefly led by the 
welfare associations and unions of the small industrial working class, and more notably low 
skilled and low paid public sector workers, all urban. 
The key significance about the Bangladesh case is the surprising lack of food-related protest 
during this period. Nor does this mark a difference with past popular responses to hunger: in 
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the past, historians and political sociologists have raised questions about the lack of hunger-
related protest, and extended academic debates have taken place about whether the best 
explanations are cultural (as in Greenough 1982) or reflect a lack of political opportunity 
(despite the moral economy motivations to protest, in line with Bohstedt 2010). In contemporary 
Bangladesh there are a number of factors that would presuppose food riots during price spikes. 
Yet the protests which were triggered by food price rises were few in number considering: a) 
the large proportion of the population exposed to hunger; b) the live tradition of political protest 
in Bangladesh; and c) the potential for political capital to be gained from organising around 
food in a society whose collective memory of famine is still raw and visceral.
At the same time, and despite the wealth of development NGOs and civil society groups, there 
was no large-scale civil society organising and no significant right to food movement. This is 
also despite the tendency to mimic Indian social policy (e.g. right to information, employment 
guarantee scheme). There is in fact no significant rights-based movement around social and 
economic rights at all in Bangladesh. 
This may reflect the fact that the country is seen as a food security policy success story – 
nutrition levels are not impressive but are comparable to elsewhere in South Asia and they 
have improved relatively fast; episodes of acute food insecurity are now rare, particularly since 
the past decade; the food security system is seen by policymakers to be good partly because 
it has mixed a responsive food security infrastructure (programmes that automatically kick in 
when needed) with a market-friendly overall approach to public food stocks management. Food 
security policymaking is both a highly political matter and deeply technocratic. It is striking that 
several key politicians and CTG administrators during this period (the Ministers of Food and 
Home Affairs under the elected Awami League government from 2009 and the Adviser/Minister 
of Trade and Commerce in the CTG) were themselves acknowledged as scholarly experts on 
hunger, nutrition and social protection. 
Yet Bangladesh is a net food grain importer, and was severely impacted by the 2008 price 
spike because of India’s rice export ban. Regional relationships – and now relationships further 
afield with ASEAN countries – are important for Bangladesh’s food security. Nevertheless, the 
food crises of 2008 and 2010–11 re-invigorated drives for food grain self-sufficiency. The CTG 
administration had been wrong-footed by the 2008 price spike: unprepared with public food 
stocks, unable to secure imports fast enough in the global market because of the protectionist 
responses of other rice-growing countries protecting their own domestic markets, prices rose 
sharply and severely. The OMS system for selling cheap grains to subsidise consumption 
and stabilise prices was inadequate for the scale of the event. The non-political character of 
the CTG administration was popularly seen as part of the problem, as it was believed that an 
elected government would have been more responsive because of its electoral pressures. By 
the time the Awami League-led government took elected office in 2009, prices were coming 
down in the global and national markets; imports had arrived, and the following harvests were 
successful. By the time of the 2010–11 price spikes, the government had extended the OMS 
and other new social protection schemes were rolled out for the rural poor. Food prices mostly 
continued to rise through the period, but no further major spikes (other than seasonal ones) 
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occurred. 
We turn now to analysis of the policy context, policymaking process, and food policy changes 
that emerged during the 2007–12 period.
4.2  The policy context and process
Article 15(2) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh states that ensuring 
food security is one of the fundamental responsibilities of the state. Since independence, 
successive governments of Bangladesh have attempted to meet this mandate. In the early 
post-independence years, this responsibility was interpreted as direct intervention in the food 
market, with the government a primary actor. However, as the National Food Policy observes, 
Food scenario in Bangladesh has undergone major changes over the last decade, 
moving from a system involving large-scale government interventions in rice and 
wheat markets to a more market-oriented system, with public food distribution 
system increasingly targeted to those households which are mostly in need.  
(GoB 2006: 3) 
In fact, over the decade prior to the 2008 food crisis, the government had liberalised the grain 
trade, created opportunities for private sector actors to import food products and build storage, 
and dismantled the public food rationing system. In fact, 
Instead of using public distribution as an outlet for public food procurement 
and price support, the emphasis has shifted toward strengthening social safety 
nets and disaster mitigation programs, and procurement and stocking are 
now being carried out up to the level necessary to sustain those programs. 
(IFPRI 2005: 35)
Bangladesh’s Food Policy in 1988 emphasised ensuring food security. However, in 2006, that 
policy document was revised significantly and food security was redefined as the scenario 
…when all people at all times have availability of and access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active, healthy and productive life.  
(GoB 2006: 2) 
This particular definition is important as it identifies availability, access and utilisation (i.e. the 
food products will fulfil the dietary and nutritional need of the citizens) as key elements. This 
means it is not enough that food grain production or prices are set at defined levels, but that all 
people should be able to access and make use of them to meet their food needs. Government 
is supposed to take necessary steps to ensure an ‘efficient and sustainable increase’ in food 
production, to achieve which it will supply the necessary agricultural inputs to the farmers at an 
‘acceptable price’. At the same time, the government is also to take steps to ensure agricultural 
diversification and use of modern agricultural technology. In this way, the government considers 
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increased food production a key step for ensuring food security, acknowledging the significance 
of the role of farmers. 
The government is no longer the only or indeed key actor in the food market, and the role of 
the private sector is also acknowledged in the provision of ‘adequate incentives for private food 
marketing, processing sorting and stock maintenance’ (GoB: 6). In terms of ensuring adequate 
food supplies, the public and the private sector will work together:
Government will develop market infrastructure so that farmers can sell food grains at a 
reasonable price by
•	 opening procurement centres to purchase food grains ‘…at a price high enough to 
cover cost of production with adequate profit for the farmers, but not so high as to 
encourage rent-seeking behavior’ (GoB 2006: 7);
•	 encouraging private sector market infrastructure from which government can procure 
and widen opportunities for farmers. 
Procured food will
•	 be made available to the poor through different safety net programmes and
•	 (when necessary) be sold at a cheap rate through the OMS and fair price market;
•	 be held in stock food and supplied to the market in times of crisis, to help stabilise 
high prices or to increase the supply under conditions of scarcity. The government will 
always aim to maintain stocks, and may import food products from other countries to 
prepare for food crises.
Private sector businesses can supply food grains either by selling to government (buying from 
domestic farmers or through imports), or they can sell in the open market.
This summary of the food supply mechanism in the National Food Policy of 2006 indicates 
that the government’s mode of operation in the food market has liberalised considerably in 
the past decades. Below we look at how the government receives information regarding food 
stocks and flows (scarcity, prices and access); what action this triggers; and how successfully 
it implements its policies, with specific reference to the 2007–12 period. 
Policy process
The 1974 famine and its political consequences made it clear to the political parties and their 
leaders that acute crisis in regard to supply of food products should never be ignored. As 
described below, events associated with 1974 famine forced the political actors to constantly 
scan the political environment to get a sense of the existing food supply scenario and react 
accordingly. Whereas in most policy domains, the government of Bangladesh had been slow 
to react, the food policy domain presents a different scenario, where the possibility of crisis 
or early crisis has always resulted in quick policy changes. Therefore, before moving to the 
discussion about how the policy arena reacts to the food crisis that existed in the country 
between 2007–12, it is necessary to briefly discuss the 1974 famine. 
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The 1974 famine
Several key informants pointed out the significance of the 1974 famine in dictating the terms of 
the food policy of Bangladesh. As one interviewee commented, 
The 1974 famine changed the politics around food. Food was the reason for 
changing political context, not BAKSAL13. Right to food and right to vote were 
merged together.14 
Successive governments learned from this early experience and they knew that a famine 
or a famine like situation would definitely bring an end to their rule. As another interviewee 
said, ‘1974 is always in the mind of the Government. Government would stop famine by all 
measures’.15 Our interviews indicate that the memory of the 1974 famine not only forced the 
government to put in place a rapid response to crises, but also to change policies rapidly. One 
food policy expert pointed out that after the 1998 flood, Bangladesh faced a difficult challenge: 
BBC predicted that 1 million people would die of starvation due to shortage of food 
created by the flood. [At that time, only the government could import food from the 
international market. To deal with this crisis…] a big policy change happened as 
the government opened up import by private sector. [The BBC’s prediction] did not 
happen due to government’s policy change. When government imports, it takes six 
to seven months, but the private sector can import very quickly.16
The enduring effect of the 1974 famine in the policy domain was mentioned in several interviews, 
and appears to be taken for granted as part of the unspoken backdrop to contemporary policy 
decisions. Some discussion of the effects of the famine, in which around 1.5 million people 
died and which presaged a period of intense political turmoil, is in order given the focus of the 
present study. 
While chronic hunger and malnutrition are major development concerns in Bangladesh, they 
lack the political urgency of acute hunger or food insecurity. It is probably no exaggeration to say 
that the avoidance of famine – or mass acute hunger – is a greater priority for the Bangladeshi 
elite than for the political classes of other low-income countries.17 The importance of averting 
famine mainly stems from the political significance of protection against subsistence crises. 
The 1974 famine occurred during a period of global economic volatility, in the aftermath of 
the liberation war with the devastation and displacement that had entailed, and in a period 
of increasing concentration of power within a single party system (BAKSAL). It is an open 
13  Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) was the one party formation established in 1975 through a short-lived constitutional 
amendment. The amendment was reversed after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, the nationalist leader and Prime Minister, in August 1975. In contempo-
rary Bangladesh, BAKSAL is often used to refer to a perceived increase in the centralization of rule.
14  Zakir Hossain, a civil society right to food activist, 7 July 2013.
15  Key informant interview (KII) with Akhter Ahmed, 31 October 2013, 9:30-11:30 am.
16  KII with Akhter Ahmed, 31 October 2013.
17  One of the authors has made this point at some length elsewhere. See N. Hossain (2005).
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secret that the nationalist hero Sheikh Mujib lost popularity and legitimacy as a result of the 
1974 famine and its associated upheavals. During our interviews and focus group discussions, 
memories of 1974 were quite often invoked, usually to explain the current existence of policies 
designed to protect against food price rises.18 That this was, in essence, a political bungle also 
seems widely accepted, even though part of the bungle involved the failure of the government 
of the period to appease the USA, key sources of food aid and longstanding foes of the Mujib 
government. The issues continue to be debated, with one recent argument that the 1974 
famine was in effect the result of a war-ravaged state-controlled economy in the hands of 
an essentially inept and corrupt political regime and an essentially indifferent 
ruling class. After all, the ruling class did not give up its official entitlements of 
subsidised food while droves of their fellow countrymen were starving to death.  
(Dowlah 2006: 354) 
Note in particular the claims of ineptitude, corruption and indifference, which appear to dominate 
contemporary recollections of the terrible event.19 One of the unusual features of Bangladesh’s 
political economy of famine is that the political classes themselves include many scholars and 
experts on these and related topics. For example, the world’s leading authority on the 1974 
famine, the economist M. K. Alamgir, is himself a member of the Bangladeshi political elite, 
having held cabinet positions as minister for planning and home affairs in two Awami League 
administrations.20 Nor is M. K. Alamgir the only member of the political elite with professional 
and scholarly expertise in food security matters. The minister for food and the adviser on 
trade to the caretaker government in 2007–8, as well as some top-ranking civil servants in 
relevant departments are acknowledged experts or scholars on issues of food security, social 
protection and local governance. This combination of political power with technocratic capacity 
makes the food sector unusually well equipped to detect and respond to major episodes of 
acute food insecurity. At the very least, these are unlikely to go unnoticed by the political elite. 
The 1974 famine has shaped the food policy domain in a definitive way – at one end, the political 
actors have always been quick to respond to any sign of crisis, and at the other, it created a 
critical knowledge-base in the bureaucratic organ of the country. As we will discuss in the next 
section, in a centralised policymaking structure, these two factors (i.e. quick response by the 
political actors and availability of expertise in policymaking), play a critical role in subverting 
major crisis.
The impact of the policymaking process on policy outcomes
Due to the absence of pluralist politics, the significance of donors in agenda-setting, and the 
highly centralised decision-making procedure, some scholars have argued that conventional 
18  The entire institutional architecture of the food policy regime is understood to rest on the lessons of famine – e.g. a book about Bangladesh’s 
food security policies successes is entitled Out of the Shadow of Famine (Ahmed, Haggblade and Chowdhury 2000). 
19  The researchers noted that among the lingering impressions of the 1974 famine was one of a sense of middle class guilt, as many people 
with whom we spoke both formally during the research and informally, in relation to it, acknowledged that poor people starved while food reserves went to 
urban groups. That this event occurred in the immediate aftermath of the nationalist struggle with its strong sense of cross-class national unity might help to 
explain the potency of the memory of the 1974 famine, and the strength of the sense of ‘never again’.
20  Although the effects of 1974 for the popularity of the incumbent party in government, the Awami League, are not documented, it is clear that 
corruption and bad policies both played a significant role. But so too did the policies of the international community, in particular the USA, whose PL480 food 
aid laws required the USA to withhold food aid because Bangladesh had been trading with Cuba, a communist government. See N. Islam 2003; Sobhan 
1979; Sen 1980; McHenry and Bird 1977. The authoritative account of 1974 remains M. Alamgir (1980).
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methods and/or models to explain policymaking processes are inapplicable to Bangladesh 
(see Osman 2004). Certain policy areas in Bangladesh have opened up in recent years (e.g. 
environment, real estate), but the food policy realm remains the closed domain of experts and 
bureaucrats. Given the political and policy importance of food, why is this case, and how does 
it affect the effectiveness of policy?
Drawing on the policy model developed by Conlan, Posner and Beam (2014), we argue that 
policy advocates aim to build support for their proposals, along two dimensions: a) the scope 
and scale of mobilisation (i.e. whether the policy advocates aim to limit access to the policy 
process to specialised groups or to facilitate access for the wider public or other actors); and b) 
forms of mobilisation, (i.e. whether the policy advocates rely on organised interest or ideas to 
push forward their policy proposals). Policies come to the policy table through four ‘pathways 
of power’: pluralist, partisan, symbolic and expert (Posner, Conlan and Beam 2002: 8-9) (see 
Table 3). 
Table 3 The Pathways Model of the policy process
Scope of mobilisation
Form of mobilisation
Specialised Mass
Ideational Expert Symbolic
Interest Pluralist Partisan
Source: adapted from Posner et al. 2002
Each pathway operates most successfully in particular environments, with particular kinds 
of decision-making, coalition-building, with characteristic results, appealing to specific actors 
who prefer to move issues onto the pathway in which they expect to achieve the best result 
(Conlan and Beam 2000: 15). The pluralist and partisan pathways reflect traditional models of 
incrementalism and presidential styles of leadership. In the expert pathway, policy experts play 
a pivotal role and the scope of mobilisation remains highly specialised. Similarly, the symbolic 
pathway emphasises ideas, although these ideas may be quite different in nature and mostly 
simple, evocative and emotional (Posner et al. 2002; Conlan and Beam 2000; Posner 2006).
Applied to food policy in Bangladesh, it is clear that policymaking has moved between expert 
and symbolic pathways. The expert pathway was dominant after the 1974 famine, with 
successive governments relying on bureaucratic and external expertise (such as the United 
Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)) in developing the basic policy framework. 
Learning from the mistakes of the 1974 famine, policies were developed based on ideas and 
at the same time, access to the policy domain was restricted – ‘politics as usual’ had no place 
in the food policy domain. Our interviews also highlighted an important contradiction to this 
model. In times of crisis, i.e. when food stocks were low, the democratic regime shifted quickly 
from the expert pathway to the symbolic one. During such moments, the government typically 
avoided identifying the underlying causes of such crises and focused instead on importing food 
as a matter of priority: 
[T]he Prime Minister has always been cautious about the food price scenario. 
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If there is a hint of crisis, the government quickly issues directives that would 
allow us to buy food grains from other countries. At the same time, we have 
signed G2G (government to government purchase) [agreements] with a number 
of countries, which allows us to buy food grains at the quickest possible time.21
This is undoubtedly a short-term approach which the government mainly takes to deal with 
imminent crisis and which is also not in line with expert ideas about food policy. But emergency 
situations force the government into symbolic responses.
The closed nature of the policy domain and its insulation from party politics through reliance on 
policy expertise has ensured adoption of policies that are technically and scientifically sound. 
However, the reliance on experts within a closed domain essentially bars farmers or their 
organisations from accessing the policy realm, so that they cannot influence them or help 
establish their mandate or standards. For instance, in Gaibandha we found policies to enable 
farmer access to procurement centres in practice favour those with means of transport and 
distribution networks, and the means to pay for inputs, while large local business interests 
control local price structures. If these farmers’ organisations had access to policy spaces, their 
experiences and interests could have contributed to designing or implementing more effective 
food policies.
The symbolic pathway is followed mainly during crises and is not a regular policy solution. 
However, longer-term solutions to issues like food price spikes are rarely sought, because 
instant fixes with symbolic value are preferred for political reasons. These quick responses 
offer temporary solutions, but do not succeed in tackling the vested interests that are believed 
to exacerbate or benefit from scarcity, price volatility or other food crises.
Policy implementation and political responses
A successful food policy includes having an adequate supply of food and a successful food 
distribution policy, including adequate safety nets for those who are unable to access food 
through the market or their personal and social entitlements. Key concerns vis-à-vis food 
policy include the adequacy and timeliness of information about food insecurity (who is hungry, 
where). Some of our informants suggested that to a significant degree, media reports are relied 
on for triggering policy action; this is despite the existence of good quality wholesale and retail 
price data and regular market analyses. This highlights again the priority of symbolic politics 
over the technocratic expert information, and helps to explain why food security policy is often 
seen to be more visibly reactive than it is proactive. A second key concern is provision of 
affordable agricultural inputs and the ability of the government to ensure food farmers receive 
a fair price. Our findings support those of other research in suggesting that irrigation fuel and 
seeds (although not fertiliser) remain a concern, and that there remains a gap between official 
policy and the reality with respect to procurement pricing. Finally, there are concerns about the 
capacity of the government to control price manipulation: our findings suggest that ‘syndicates’ 
operate in the following way. Rice suppliers work together with international rice importers and 
some dishonest government officials:
21  KII with Md. Nazrul Islam, Sr. Assistant Secretary, Food Division, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, 24 October 2013; 12:40-1:30 pm.
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The ball starts rolling when the government is in need of importing rice from 
the international market and has to depend on the local agents for that. With 
the help of the dishonest government officials, these local agents keep track of 
government’s stock and when the government invites tender for rice importation, 
they submit their tenders. A key condition of winning the tender is if they fail to 
import rice within the stipulated time, they have to pay a fine of BDT5-7 crore (USD 
650,000-900,000). However, what happens is, these local agents intentionally 
delay the process of rice importation and when there is not adequate rice in the 
market, the price usually goes high. And the local agents import the rice at this 
stage with the help of the international suppliers and sell rice at a much higher 
price. In this way, they make a huge amount of profit even after paying the fine 
of BDT5-7 crore (USD 650,000-900,000). In effect, they create a false crisis and 
make profit out of it.22
Hoarding or syndicates are also facilitated because the government may lack adequate storage 
for the food stocks it has been purchasing in larger quantities since the period of food price 
volatility started in 2007. Grain traders with capacity to dry wet paddy and store grains can buy 
paddy from the farmers at a low price when the government fails to buy from them. This role 
enables them to act as brokers by forcing the famers to sell paddy cheaply; after it has been 
stored for some time it can be supplied to the market. An artificial shortage can be created to 
enable traders to sell rice at a higher price. 
It is interesting to note that even though practices to manipulate the price mechanism are 
understood by government, action is rarely taken against them. In fact, previous experience 
shows that price manipulation when joined with other factors such as global price hikes may 
result in deep crisis. However, even at time of crisis, elected governments usually focus on 
ameliorating the crisis by increasing supply through rice imports. By contrast, during the 2008 
crisis, the unelected caretaker government tried to tackle syndicates and hoarding. Many 
policy actors believed that unelected governments (of which Bangladesh has had several) 
are generally slower to respond to food crises, and often fail to prioritise them. In fact, when 
the food crisis hit in 2007, the then government was successful in identifying the presence of 
a syndicate that controlled the price and they decided to go after it. The consequence was 
disastrous – they failed to do so and encouraged the syndicate in furthering the crisis and 
furthermore, they failed to respond quickly to the needs of the citizen. An interviewee explained 
the failure of the response:
[In 2007], the government decided to buy rice from the farmers at BDT18/kg. 
However, in the open market, rice was sold at BDT20/kg. As a result, there was 
no reason for the farmers to sell rice at a lower price. The street-level bureaucrats 
quickly identified the issue and asked the government to increase the buying 
price. But as the then government did not have the electoral accountability to 
the people, they were late to respond and when they finally increased the price 
22  KII with Mushfeka Ikfat, Secretary, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, 24 October 2013; 11 am -12:30 pm
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to BDT20/kg, in the open market price went up to BDT24/kg. Therefore, the 
government failed to avert the crisis.23 
Several interviewees argued that in a democratic government, decisions to deal with food 
crises are taken quickly – ‘at the end of the day, the politicians know that they will not be able 
to stay in power if the situation becomes worse. They always keep a sharp eye on the food 
situation and do not hesitate to take quick decisions’, said one bureaucrat. 
Others, particularly experts on global food markets and the international situation, noted that 
the caretaker government’s hands were tied. One reason its options were limited was that 
domestic food stocks were low due to policies having changed towards purchasing more food 
on the international market for price stabilisation interventions – an instance of the kind of open 
market orientation favoured by the Washington institutions. India’s decision to close its borders 
to achieve its own symbolic policy change had some effects on pricing in Bangladesh. But the 
speed with which the spike transmitted from the global to the local markets, and the extent of 
the increase meant, in the view of some experts, that any administration would have found it 
hard to address. In the end, the policies put in place by the caretaker government began to 
show results only when the next political government, the Awami League-led government of 
2009–13, took power. 
4.3  Policy changes
Our discussion so far indicates that in regard to policy change in the food policy domain, 
mainly two possible pathways may be followed. First, the long-range policy initiatives reflect 
a critical mix of political reality (i.e. political actors’ intention to be responsive to food-related 
crisis) and expert-based knowledge provided by the bureaucracy. Consequently, the policies 
are developed following an expert-based pathway and the focus here is to develop long-range 
policy solutions to the existing problems. A centralised policymaking structure eventually 
creates a centralised implementation framework where government bureaucracy plays the key 
role in ensuring the supply of food and agricultural inputs. Second, in time of crisis, the policy 
changes are rapid and arbitrary and such changes are not based on an expert consensus. 
Dealing with the crisis becomes the major focus and the government often goes for quick 
solutions while ignoring the potential consequences. The question, therefore, is: can the policy 
changes that took place in Bangladesh between 2007 and 2012 be explained through these 
two pathways? In this section, we have tried to answer this question and our starting point is 
the 2006 food policy.
As explained earlier, the National Food Policy of Bangladesh is a comprehensive document 
that has been developed by taking expert opinion. Successive governments have worked 
on this policy since the World Food Summit of 1996 and consequently, have developed a 
comprehensive food security policy framework (the National Food Policy) and a programming 
document (the National Food Policy Plan of Action) as well as an investment plan for food 
security and nutrition (the Bangladesh Country Investment Plan). It is important to note that 
these major policy documents have two distinctive focuses – on the one hand, the policies are 
23  KII with Dr, Mihir Kanti Majumder, Ex-Secretary, 21 October 2013, 5-6 pm
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aimed at bolstering deregulation of the market and strengthening the private sector, and on 
the other, they also included provisions allowing the government to directly intervene in the 
market in times of crisis. In other words, the policy documents eventually created opportunities 
for both expert-based and symbolic interventions. Therefore, it is not surprising that whereas 
the government processes of market deregulation and liberalisation of trade in agricultural 
machinery and inputs often follow a gradual process, policy actions aimed at controlling the 
market, especially at the time of crisis, have been taken rather quickly. The remaining part of 
this section shows the process of different policy actions taken by the government between 
2007 and 2012.
Encouraging the private sector
As indicated earlier, since the mid-1980s, the government has significantly liberalised the food 
grain market and the current policy document also highlights the significant role of this sector 
in the food market. In fact, the role played by the private sector was bolstered in 1998 when the 
then government was trying to deal with the major natural disaster of the floods.
Under the current policy regime, the private sector can import rice from international market to 
sell to the government and local market, can buy rice or paddy from the farmer and can build 
storage facilities to stock rice. Whereas some of these measures, if not monitored properly, 
can manipulate the price structure of the food market, the government has actually showed 
its intention over time to work closely with the private sector. In fact, to encourage imports 
and discourage exports during the period of rising prices, the successive government had 
taken some important trade policy measures. For instance, on 8 March 2007, the government 
eliminated existing tariffs on the import of rice, wheat and other essential items (crude edible 
oil, lentils, onion, and chick peas). In addition, commercial importers were no longer required 
to renew value added tax (VAT) registration on an annual basis. All of these policy initiatives 
had been taken to encourage the private sector to actively participate in the food market. In 
fact, as the existing studies point out, the change in policies promoted massive private sector 
investment in groundwater irrigation that fuelled rapid diffusion of high-yielding rice varieties. 
The growth in rice production accelerated from 2.2 per cent per year during 1970–90 to 3.4 per 
cent during 1991–2008 (Hossain and Deb 2010).
Support for agricultural production
In the last few years, the government’s proactive policy to boost agricultural production was 
much more effective, which extended to increased and regular supply of several different inputs: 
credit, irrigation and fertiliser. In the recent past, The Bangladesh Bank issued a directive to 
commercial banks to increase disbursement of agricultural credit to meet the working capital 
needs of small and marginal farmers, particularly targeting areas affected by the floods and 
the cyclone. Many private sector commercial banks (which did not have their branches in rural 
areas) channelled agricultural credit through NGOs engaged in micro-credit operations. The 
disbursement of agricultural credit in the financial year 2007/8 (Taka 61.67 billion / USD 808 
million) was 16.51 per cent higher than the total disbursement of agricultural credit in 2006/7 
(BDT 52.93 billion / USD 678 million). The government also provided (for the first time) a 
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subsidy on diesel used in irrigation. It was provided directly to farmers and amounted to Taka 
2.5 billion (USD 33 million) in 2007/8. The 20 per cent subsidy for electricity used in irrigation 
was also continued (Hossain and Deb 2010). 
The government also maintained a subsidy on urea fertilisers (implemented at the border) 
despite the rapid rise in its price on the world market. Indeed, the subsidy on urea increased 
to nearly 80 per cent of the procurement cost, and due to the very high level of subsidy, the 
government had to ration distribution of urea fertiliser with the help of public administrators 
(deputy commissioners, Upazila Nirbahi officers, agriculture officers). As a result, domestic 
urea prices were relatively stable. In contrast to urea, the prices of triple superphosphate (TSP) 
and muriate of potash fertiliser increased rapidly because world prices of these commodities 
increased sharply and all imports go through the private sector. The higher prices had a 
negative impact on use of non-urea fertilisers (Hossain and Deb 2010).
Social safety net programmes
As mentioned earlier, to ensure food security for the lower-income groups who were hit hard by 
the price hike, the government undertakes a number of strategies. Known as social safety net 
programmes (SSNPs), these became a major focus of the government’s activities since the 
1974 famine. During that time, a number of schemes including the vulnerable group feeding 
(VGF) and the vulnerable group development (VGD) were developed for the poor. These 
were mainly public works and food aid programmes. However, in the 1990s the Government 
began to introduce schemes that addressed risks across the lifecycle, such as school stipend 
programmes and allowances for the elderly, people with disabilities, and widows (GoB 2013; 
GoB 2012).
The successive governments in Bangladesh have shown strong commitment to the SSNPs 
and as a result, budgetary allocation has increased both in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of GDP. According to the Bangladesh National Social Protection Strategy (draft version as of 
2013),
the allocation for Social Protection Programmes (SPPs) increased from 1.3 per cent 
of GDP in 1998 to 2.5 per cent in FY2011. Since then, it has stabilised around 2.0 per 
cent of GDP. Although this level of funding is modest by international standards, when 
measured against the government’s tight budget situation, this represents a substantial 
commitment, accounting for 12 per cent of total government spending, and reflects the 
high priority accorded by the Government to this aspect of the social development policy. 
(GoB 2013: 7-8) 
Official data compiled by the Ministry of Finance indicates that there are as many as 95 SSNPs 
currently operating in the country. In the 2012-13 fiscal year, the government spent BDT231bn 
which is 2.2 per cent of the total GDP. During the 2007–12 period, the government spent a 
significant amount of money on the food aid schemes. In response to the protests in the city 
areas, the scope and function of the OMS programme has increased as reflected in the 2013 
budgetary allocation. 
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The government often introduces new programmes. For instance, during the 2008/9 fiscal 
year, the government introduced a new programme entitled ‘100 Days Employment Generation 
Scheme’ with an allocation of BDT 20 billion (USD 260 million) to generate 200 million person-
days of employment for the very poor and for marginal farmers in rural areas. The programme 
targeted severe poverty-stricken areas such as the Monga (seasonally food-insecure), affected 
areas in the north-west, areas prone to river erosion and Char areas (newly emerged areas in 
the river bed) (Hossain and Deb 2010). 
Government intervention in the food market
As indicated earlier, the direct intervention by the government in the food market includes 
actions like stocking, selling rice at a cheaper price etc. Since the 1974 famine, successive 
governments have been cautious about maintaining a stock of food grain. This focus on 
maintaining a stock of foodgrain strengthened after the crisis facing the country in 2007. The 
failure of the then caretaker government encouraged the next elected government to maintain 
a healthy stock of food grain and also to increase their stocking capacity. During our interviews 
with the government officials, a number focused on this particular aspect. According to them, 
to ensure food security the government needs to maintain a stock of 3.3 million metric tons of 
food grains. Even though in the last five years, the government has increased its capacity, it 
can stock only up to 1.9 million metric tonnes 19 lac metric tonnes; for the rest, they have to 
depend on the private sector. Maintaining this stock of rice helps the government control food 
prices especially in times of crisis. For instance, when the price of rice goes up and it becomes 
difficult for citizens to buy at a reasonable price, the government can either lower the price by 
ensuring adequate supply or by selling at a cheaper rate to the citizens. 
In fact, providing food products at a cheaper price to the lower-income groups who were hard 
hit by the price hike is a major strategy of the government, achieved through the Public Food 
Grain Distribution System (PFDS) which comprises several programmes: Essential Priority 
(EP), Other Priority (OP), Large Employee Industries (LEI), Flour Mills (FM), Open Market 
Sales (OMS) and Fair Price Card (FPC). Because of limited stocks, the government could 
increase the total PFDS allocation in 2007–8 by only 6.7 per cent, to 1.56 million tonnes. This 
amount was too small to have an impact on market prices (Hossain and Deb 2010). 
However, it should be noted here that during the 2007–12 period, the government introduced 
and modified a number of policies to ensure adequate supply of food to the market and to 
people. These policies include the OMS Policy of 2012, Fair Price Policy 2010 (updated each 
year up to 2014), and the Internal Food Collection Policy 2010. A brief description of these is 
provided in the appendix section. The government also allowed the paramilitary force to operate 
OMS of essential commodities, including rice, at subsidised prices to urban consumers. This 
was a popular action during the food crisis of 2007. In 2006–7 about 408,000 tonnes of rice 
were sold through the OMS. As the market stabilised in 2008, the amount sold through OMS 
dropped to 268,000 tonnes. 
Another short-term approach adopted by the recent government to deal with the food crisis is 
signing the government-to-government (G2G) agreements with different countries. The current 
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government felt the need to sign these following the 2007 crisis when India refused to provide 
rice instead of signing an accord with Bangladesh. Under the G2G, Bangladesh can quickly 
import and buy rice from other countries. This is undoubtedly a short-term approach, which the 
government mainly takes to deal with imminent crisis. 
The government has signed these G2Gs since 2009 and these have been very useful in dealing 
with crisis. In fact, in 2012, the government signed a G2G with Thailand. The Commerce 
Minister of Thailand Boonsong Teriyaphirom exchanged a memorandum of understanding on 
rice exports with Barun Dev Mitra, secretary of the Food Division of Bangladesh, under which 
Bangladesh was planning to import 300,000 to 400,000 tonnes of rice from Thailand in 2012.24 
24  The Nation, 16 March 2012.
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5.  CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The research has attempted to show that subsistence protests were relatively rare in Bangladesh 
in 2007–12 – at least, a reasonable informed observer would have expected more of such 
action, because of the exposure of the population to the global price spikes and because of 
the country’s rich tradition of unruly politics and organised civil society action. From our close 
analysis of those protests that did occur, we learned the following: 
•	 Food price rises, no matter how dramatic, did not produce riots; instead, specific outrages 
linked to corruption or rights abuses were the triggers, in contexts where rapid cost of living 
rises were leading to simmering discontent.
•	 Some groups were particularly acutely exposed to these price rises, as they were unable 
to: a) benefit from price rises as producers; or b) protect themselves against price rises 
as urban consumers, dependent on food markets for their survival. Some of these groups 
were particularly exposed and without recourse to official pay rises or effective upward 
pressures on wages (such as the RMG workers).
•	 Occupational and spatial concentration enabled organisation. Groups that protested did 
not organise just for that purpose, but had prior histories of mobilisation.
•	 Clear and strong moral economy ideas – about fairness in relation to work and wages, about 
‘the good life’ and about state responsibilities to citizens – were articulated as explanations 
and justification for protests.
•	 Strikingly, there was no sense of opposition or division between the interests of rural and 
urban poor people: protesters noted a continuity in their interests, as against the interests 
of big business people, whether traders in the food business, factory owners or politicians.
•	 Corruption and the connections with party politics were a major grievance, yet people 
expected the state to act to protect them nonetheless.
A key conclusion about the RMG protests specifically is that these mark a ‘certification’ of the 
interests of these citizens and workers (Tilly 2008). That they are predominantly women is 
significant. Historically and until the recent past, young women have been the responsibility of 
fathers, husbands, sons and sometimes brothers. Young urban women (and to some extent, 
young urban men too) have not customarily warranted the direct protection of the state with 
respect to their subsistence. The 2008 crisis marked a moment in which it was clear that familial 
protection was no longer available to these groups, and that the ‘patronage’ of employment in 
garments factories was not enough to provide basic sustenance. Although we lack the space 
to discuss this in detail here, it seems clear that the garments workers’ protests were about 
putting the concerns of an entirely new social category on the policy table. Despite much 
criticism of the violence of their protests, it is undeniable that the garments workers (men and 
women) are now recognised as an interest group of considerable importance in Bangladesh. 
Our somewhat impressionistic findings from the research suggest that in the view of the food 
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policymaking elite, the garments protests were not ‘food riots’, it is nevertheless clear that the 
needs of low paid urban workers were forcefully and unforgettably laid on the policy table as a 
result of their protests. 
For the Gaibandha smaller farmer/trader committee, it seems clear that this group is waging a 
campaign that has the wider support of other agricultural smallholders and business people. 
The Communist Party of Bangladesh appears to have selected a very popular and legitimate 
campaign to support. However, the strength of the local political party nexus, from several of 
the bigger parties and both of the behemoth AL and BNP parties, means that without additional 
support – whether from the national media, civil society groups or NGOs – the KBSS is 
likely to struggle to achieve its aims. The successful experience of leasing and running the 
market during the caretaker government period demonstrates the potential for effectiveness 
and accountability of participatory governance, but it seems unlikely the experiment will be 
repeated.
The performance of the caretaker government in responding to the 2008 spike is of interest: 
the popular and to some extent, official, discourse is that democratic governments do far better 
in making a swift and appropriate response. (Technocrats and researchers perhaps inevitably 
take a different view of the matter.) We agree in principle, because our research consistently 
supported this view, that elected governments fear food crises as ways of losing legitimacy. 
This is true even though chronic under-nutrition and malnutrition appear to lack political bite in 
the same way. However, we do not feel able to pronounce definitely on whether the caretaker 
government performed as well as an elected government might have done: the context was 
deeply challenging, and they responded differently. The combination of their response with the 
political economy of food prices in Bangladesh may have worsened a bad situation, but it is 
beyond our capacities to prove this in any rigorous way. 
Nevertheless, the Bangladeshi state displayed a sensitivity to food price rises that enabled a 
response to 2008 that helped manage the 2011 price spike more effectively. In particular, price 
stabilisation measures were stepped up, access to subsidised food was increased, and social 
protection was distributed more widely, particularly in rural areas. These conditions, with rising 
rural and urban wages, mean that of all the issues Bangladeshis needed to protest about, food 
was not among the most urgent. 
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ANNEX
Note on the Political Events Catalogue
Muhammad Ashikur Rahman
We basically produced the political event catalogue out of reports published in three newspapers. 
Among three, Bengali version of Prothom Alo and The Daily Ittefaq were scrutinised and The 
Daily Star was the only English daily to look up events from. According to the methodology 
developed earlier, we were supposed to look for events searching with key words and 
alternatively going through newspapers on a date by date basis. In terms of key word search, 
The Daily Star produces results that we could be able to compile and put into the catalogue 
spread sheet though date by date search would have carried better result meaning more 
events could have been found. This fact is revealed after Prothom Alo and The Daily Ittefaq 
were investigated in an alternative way resulting in more relevant results being found. The 
reason why we had to choose date by date search for these two daily is that Bengali key words 
fetch random lists of events that we did not require for our subject matter. But this method was 
more challenging and tedious than the key word based search which was successfully done 
on The Daily Star.        
The Daily Ittefaq search was rather challenging as we did not find online archives of the daily 
for the required period. Therefore we had to go for searching printed version of the newspaper. 
A team of 12 students from the University of Dhaka helped in this manual searching. At the 
University of Dhaka, there is a newspaper section where printed versions of almost all dailies 
and weekly newspapers and magazines have been archived. The team worked there collecting 
reports along with the dates and page numbers. But unfortunately there was no provision for 
photocopying the reports. At that point we figured snap shooting would be a good way to 
accomplish the job. Then we took snapshots of every report along with their tails in other 
segments of the newspaper. 
Date by date search was wearisome as we had to check 7 years’ newspaper which means 
7*365=2555 dailies from the first page to the last. That was quite a big job and thanks to the 
team of Dhaka University. Prothom Alo was done single-handedly by me but that was online, 
easily accessible and no photocopy and snapshots were necessary. 
Methodology was both challenging and interesting as well. Looking back to the state of food 
price and movements around the issue with a number of connected issues such as agriculture, 
fertilizer, cost of living, wage etc. allowed us to analyse and compare what popular mobilisations 
were like before and how did those shape recent trends of popular mobilisation. We got the 
opportunity to have a glimpse of the nature of media reporting around food and its price-
centered popular movements. We found a volume of news in all three newspapers reporting 
on different forms of popular mobilisation around food price hike with little bit of difference each 
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newspaper maintained. In terms of movements around agricultural issues such as farmers’ 
tension over good and sufficient fertilizer, seeds, diesel, subsidy etc. for example, The Daily 
Ittefaq, seemed to give more emphasis than the other two on agricultural issues. This focus 
on agriculture tells us about the target clients of the Daily Ittefaq. If we see historically, Ittefaq 
is one of the oldest daily of Bangladesh originating in 1953 and having a good coverage all 
over the country including rural areas where essentially farmers live. During the liberation war 
Ittefaq played a vital role. Since its origin it had a moral obligation to agriculture and farmers 
which was reflected in our political event catalogue as well. Therefore, rural people, farmers 
are still reached by this daily and it talks about their problems and issues more and more.  
The Daily Star and Prothom Alo, on the other hand, originated way after liberation and their 
focus was more on urban clients. That may be why popular mobilisation around food price 
hike, less wage and salary, living cost taking place in urban areas were mostly highlighted 
in these newspapers. It is not that Ittefaq did not cover urban events as significantly as the 
other two did, but it seemed to have an additional contemplation on rural areas. Stories of 
garments workers’ mobilisation taking place mostly in urban areas for higher salary came in all 
newspapers virtually with a similar weight given. The magnitude of violence in garments workers’ 
mobilisation was higher than that of other popular mobilisation which is why all newspapers 
put most of these stories either on the first page or last page. Language standards, accuracy 
of information, number of words and column size of reports remained more or less same in all 
three newspapers. However, reports on popular mobilisations around agricultural issues were 
mostly placed inside the newspapers. 
Newspapers sometimes publish politically motivated reports to retain or break people’s 
confidence over the government. Media in Bangladesh is either directly or ideologically 
affiliated with political parties. A large part of both print and electronic media is owned by 
political leaders or by people who explicitly believe in a particular political ideology. This setup 
of media has an absolute influence on its reporting fashion over any issue. Food availability 
and price is a major determinant of Bangladesh’s government failure or success. So reporting 
on popular mobilisation around food price hike is a sensitive issue for both government and 
media itself. Besides, we cannot say media is altogether independent in Bangladesh. So either 
consciously, for loyalty to the government or unintentionally being forced by some quarter, 
media reporting has been characterised by biasness and half-truths. Before onion price goes 
on hike recently, some media reported that onion production had been 18 ton last year. But 
later from the very Ministry of Agriculture, it was revealed that the production was 6 ton less 
than it was reported. People knew that there was no deficit in onion production but in practice 
the picture was different. Once the fact was revealed the price started spiraling. So media 
always has this purpose of forming and deforming people’s perception about food market 
and price. While reporting protests centering food price, media maintains similar practice. 
Because, they do not want to put government in an embarrassing situation circulating news 
that reveals government’s failure in controlling food market. On the other hand some media 
hostile to the government do the reverse. A classic example in this regard may be cited here. In 
an FGD with journalists of different newspapers, we asked what the role media played during 
the last caretaker government with respect to reporting protests around food price hike. They 
admittedly confirmed that media exaggerated virtually all food related public gatherings as 
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sort of protests for food. A queue of people waiting to purchase rice from OMS25 was shown to 
have agitated for essential goods. There are a number of citations of this kind came out from 
journalists. However, food market during caretaker government was really at a cross road. 
Soon after caretaker government takes the power, a large scale storm called SIDR swept 
over the the country. In that year, production of rice remained 22 lac ton less than that of 
the previous year. Stockpiling of certain items makes the market situation worse. Besides, 
businessmen were under pressure of government anti-corruption move. Some importers could 
not import at that period as big spenders were under the magnifying glass of Bangladesh 
Bank and Anti-corruption Commission. The newly installed government had a research done 
by CPD26 showing that businessmen and middlemen are responsible for increasing food 
price. The interim government then started netting businessmen with charge of irregularities 
and corruption. They also imposed excessive rules and regulations in operating business. 
This interference of the government in the market had some consequences. In order to avert 
trouble, nobody wanted to show their money and consequently import virtually halted resulting 
in rise of essential goods like oil, rice, wheat etc. And all these issues were covered by the 
media with a bit of hyperbole.                
 
Government is not the only target though of the media to keep happy or to hurt. Syndicates 
such as business tycoons importing food items play key roles in controlling the food market. 
These business persons monopolize/stockpile certain imported food items and thus can have 
influence over news reporting for the sake of their business. So clearly there have been some 
manipulation and biasness prevalent in the media in terms of reporting around food issues.   
Media certainly have some positive roles to correct loopholes of government actions over 
food issues. Government takes strategies to keep their image intact by producing information 
which is not altogether true. Government also tries to present a scene differently so that it 
cannot hurt the price structure of foods. In other words they try to misguide consumers or 
hide information so that their popularity does not get hurt. But media seems omnipresent in 
Bangladesh trying to discover the reality regardless of their varying ethical positions. A study 
of BBS27 showed that there is a surplus of 27 lac ton food in Bangladesh. But their calculation 
was interesting. BBS produced this result subtracting consumption data found by themselves 
from the production data of BIDS28. The result did not portray the real scenario as either BBS 
data or BIDS data was wrong. Government was convinced with the finding and a meeting was 
called in Prime Minister Office to make decisions for exporting rice depending on the research 
findings which were methodologically incorrect. Media reported the issue immediately. As a 
result government felt the pressure and was compelled to withdraw the decision of exporting 
rice. If the export decision was made and executed, price of rice would have doubled at that 
time. So media played a positive part in that case.                
25  Open Market Sale, a government safety net programme selling essential goods like 
rice, wheat, oil, dal, sugar, onion etc. at price less than the market price. Usually a truck loaded 
with goods stays in a public place where people maintaining queue purchase goods. Some-
times line gets longer and authority is not able to provide with goods according to the demand 
which results in eruption of agitation or small protests against the authority.    
26  Center for Policy Dialogue, a think tank in Bangladesh 
27  Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
28  Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
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Major policies introduced during or relevant to the research period
Title Year Implementing 
Ministries/
Agencies
Context Objective Main Provisions
The 
National 
Food 
Policy
2006 Ministry of 
Food and 
Disaster Man-
agement
1. To fill in the limita-
tion of the existing food 
policy
2. A renewed focus on 
food security
3. To develop a policy 
in line with the National 
Poverty Reduction 
Strategy
4. International Com-
mitment (Signatory of 
GATT Uruguay Round, 
Strong role in World 
Food Summit, 1996)
1. Adequate and 
stable supply of safe 
and nutritious food
2. Increased pur-
chasing power and 
access to food of 
the people
3. Adequate nutri-
tion for all individ-
ual especially the 
women and children
1. Provide adequate funding for agricultural research and 
food production
2. Develop a long term food production plan
3. Ensure efficient use of water resources for agricultural 
production through developing improved irrigation infra-
structure
4. Ensure timely, adequate and balnced pricing and sup-
ply of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs
5. Encourage private investment and selective liberaliza-
tion in the seed sector
6. Increase the use of modern technologies for develop-
ment of new varieties of crops
7. Emphasize on increased production of non-cereal crops
8. Encourage infrastructural development for creating 
markets of agricultural goods
9. Provide incentives for private sector food marketing, 
processing, sorting and stock maintenance
10. Manage private sector food imports and encourage 
export of food products in times of surplus and excessive 
supply
11. Development of trade supportive legal and regulatory 
environment
12. Purchase food grain from the domestic markets 
through open competitive tenders and/or at a price high 
enough that would ensure profit for the farmers
13. Allow the government to directly intervene in the mar-
ket at times of abnormal increase or decrease in the food 
grain market
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Rice 
Collec-
tion and 
Control 
Order
2008 Ministry of 
Food and 
Disaster Man-
agement
This order was pro-
mulgated during the 
time of food crisis that 
took place in 2008. It 
replaced the Bengal 
Rice Mills Control Order 
of 1943
Allowed the govern-
ment to directly in-
terfere in the market 
(as per the Food 
Policy) to ensure 
adequate stock and 
fair price of rice
1. Allowed the government to collect adequate amount of 
rice from the owner of licensed rice mills
2. Ensured that only the licensed rice mill owners would 
be able to particiapte in rice business
3. The owners have to follow the directives of the govern-
ment while buying, selling or distributing rice
4. The Government can order the rice mill owners to sup-
ply specific amount of rice (amount and price determined 
by the government) and the owners are obligated to follow 
the government’s directives
Fair Price 
Policy and 
Orders
2010-
2014
Ministry of 
Food and 
Disaster Man-
agement
Started in 2010 to deal 
with the food price hike. 
The orders are updated 
every year
1. To ensure that 
food items are deliv-
ered to the poor at a 
reasonable price
2. Development of 
a mechanism to 
identify the poor ad-
versely affected by 
the existing market 
system
3. Development of 
a price monitoring 
system
1. Development of a mechanism to identify and distribute 
“cards” to the poor people which will allow them to buy 
food products at a low price.
2. Formation of committees in each division, district and 
union. This committee will select people eligible for “card” 
based on set criteria
3. Issuing 22,25,000 cards in total (in 2012)
4.  Each cardholder will get 20 kg rice per month. They 
will pay BDT 24/kg. The government may increase or 
reduce the price if necessary. However, through a differ-
ent government order in 2014, the amount and price was 
changed. Each card holder now get 15 kg rice (at BDT 24/
kg) and 5 kg flour (at BDT 22/kg) per month.
5. The process will be monitored by the government food 
controllers
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Internal 
Food 
Collection 
Policy
2010 Directorate 
General of 
Food, Ministry 
of Food and 
Disaster Man-
agement
The policy was pro-
mulgated to amend the 
policy of 2005. 
1. To ensure ad-
equate profit for the 
farmers
2. To stabilize the 
food grain market
3. Develop ad-
equate stock to 
ensure food security
4. Ensure adequate 
supply to the Public 
Food Distribution 
System
1. Provides a directive that food grains have to be bought 
directly from the farmers
2.  According to this, government will buy food grains 
at Central Storage Depot (CSD) or Local Stirage Depot 
(LSD) controlled by the food directorate of the Ministry. In 
case of non-availability of such arrangements, special pro-
visions will be made under the supervision of the Regional 
Food Controller or District Food Controller
3. “First Come, First Serve” policy will be followed in case 
of buying rice and wheat. The government will not buy 
from any businessmen and middlemen. The farmers have 
to be present.
4. From each farmer, the government will buy between 
40/70 kg (minimum) and 3 metric ton of rice. In case of 
wheat, the amount will between 50/80 kg and 3 metric ton.
5. Committees will be formed at the National. Divisional, 
District and Upazila level to monitor the food collection 
process.
S.R.O. 
No. 113- 
Act/2011
2011 Ministry of 
Food and 
Disaster Man-
agement
This order was promul-
gated to prevent food 
hoarding
The main objective 
of this order was 
to ensure that the 
businessmen were 
not generating crisis 
by stocking exces-
sive amount of food 
grains
1. Unless allowed by the government, no businessmen is 
permitted to stock more than 1 metric ton food products
2. Specified the amount of food products that cen be 
stocked by the government-licnesed businessmen 
Open 
Market 
Sales 
Policy
2012 Ministry of 
Food and 
Disaster Man-
agement
Provided the basic 
guidelines for the Fair 
Price Policy and Orders
1. Development of a 
guideline to distrib-
ute food products 
through the Public 
Food Distribution 
System
2. Control Food 
Price Hike
3. Stabilize the 
market
1. Points out the eligibility criteria for the dealers partici-
pating in the OMS
2. Explains the process of selling food products
3. Describes the process through which the OMS ceneters 
can be identified
4. Allowed the Ministry of Food and Disaster Control to 
exercise complete control in regard to conduct and moni-
tor the OMS
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Safe Food 
Act
2013 Ministry of 
Food and 
Disaster Man-
agement
The anti-aduleration 
drive conducted by the 
government brought 
the issue of food safety 
in the forefront. There 
were concerns about 
the quality of food 
products sold in the 
market and this Act was 
designed as the first 
step to address these 
concerns
1. To ensure the 
right of access to 
safe food
2. To ensure that 
proper scientific 
methods are be-
ing followed in 
exporting, import-
ing, preserving and 
distributing food 
products
1. Formation of National Safe Food Management Advisory 
Council and National Safe Food Authority (NSFA)
2. The main goal of the NSFA is to help the designated 
authorities in determining and maintaining the quality of 
food products
3. Bans the use of harmful chemical elements (including 
formalin, calcium carbaide) and insecticides
4. Bans the distribution and preservation of adulterated 
food
5. Bans the districbution of expired food products
6. Emphasizes on proper packaging and labelling of food 
products
S.R.O. 
No. 369- 
Act/2013
2013 Ministry of 
Labor
In response to the 
protest of the work-
ers employed in the 
Garments Sector, the 
GoB decided to set a 
minimum wage. 
The act was intro-
duced to ensure the 
minimum wage in 
the garments sector
1. Divides the workers of the garments sectors in two 
categories- labor and staff.
2. Employees of the labor categories are further divided 
into 7 groups and their minimum wages are-
Grade 1 (Pattern master, Chief Quality Controller etc.)- 
BDT 13,000
Grade 2 (Mechanic, Cutting Master)- BDT 10, 900
Grade 3 (Sample machinist, Senior Sewing Machine 
operator etc.)- BDT 6,805
Grade 4 (Sewing, Winding, Knitting Machine Opeators 
etc.)- BDT 6,420
Grade 5 (Junior Operators etc.)- BDT 6,042
Grade 6 (General Operators)- BDT 5,678
Grade 7 (Assistant Operators, Assistant Cutters etc.)- 
BDT 5,300
3. Employyes of the Staff categories are further divided 
into 4 categories and theire minimum wages are-
Grade 1 (Store-keeper)- BDT 10,200
Grade 2 (Assistant Store-keeper, Cashier etc.)- BDT 8,100
Grade 3 (Typist, Clerks, Time-keepers etc.)- BDT 7,400
Grade 4 (Peon, Cook, Sweeper etc.)- BDT 5,650
4. Determines that a normal workday of the employess will 
consist of 8 hours
5. They will get a pay raise of 5% each year
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National 
Occu-
pational 
Health 
and 
Safety 
Policy
Draft Ministry of 
Labor
To provide a safe 
working place for 
the workers
Still at a draft stage. Does not provide specific guidelines
The methodology for the political events catalogue for the Bangladesh case 
study
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